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Brown v. CSS

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

January 15, 2019

LAVON LEE BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
CSS et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          David J. Hale, Judge United States District Court.

         Plaintiff Lavon Lee Brown filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. The complaint is now before the Court for initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action upon screening.

         I.

         Plaintiff, identifying himself as a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), sues “CSS, ” whom he states provides medical services for LMDC, and D. Harvey, whom he states is an LMDC officer. Plaintiff sues Defendant Harvey in his official capacity only.

         Plaintiff states that he was booked into LMDC on July 21, 2018. He asserts that he was called “to get vitals done” and did everything he was told to do. He maintains that he was told to go back and sit down. Plaintiff then states the following:

As I stood I felt myself stumble a little and didn't feel too well so I locked myself in the single cell so I wouldn't bring harm to anyone in the room or to myself. I told D. Harvey that my body was numb and I was high off something I never took before so I need detox he then made a mockery of me said I was lying and later had my window covered with a bag. I was yelling, kicking, screaming. I couldn't control my actions at all it was the drug effects I thought I was going to die in the cell I was in.

         Plaintiff maintains that the cell was twenty degrees and that “the floor was wet with urine that was not mine.” He continues, “I kept screaming for help but no one heard me I wanted medical attention but never received none they left me in the cell I put myself in for 24 hours in those conditions.” Plaintiff states that he had “no mattress, no soap, no food, it was dirty and cold and I just wanted to die in there I wanted to kill myself cause it felt like that's what they were trying to do to me.” He asserts, “I was neglected my right to live in a clean envirnment was neglected and medical attention I never received. Medical never stepped in and ask me of my wishes either.”

         As relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.

         II.

         When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

         Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         III.

         A. ...


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