United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
J. Hale, Judge United States District Court.
Lavon Lee Brown filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. The
complaint is now before the Court for initial screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated
below, the Court will dismiss the action upon screening.
identifying himself as a pretrial detainee at the Louisville
Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), sues “CSS,
” whom he states provides medical services for LMDC,
and D. Harvey, whom he states is an LMDC officer. Plaintiff
sues Defendant Harvey in his official capacity only.
states that he was booked into LMDC on July 21, 2018. He
asserts that he was called “to get vitals done”
and did everything he was told to do. He maintains that he
was told to go back and sit down. Plaintiff then states the
As I stood I felt myself stumble a little and didn't feel
too well so I locked myself in the single cell so I
wouldn't bring harm to anyone in the room or to myself. I
told D. Harvey that my body was numb and I was high off
something I never took before so I need detox he then made a
mockery of me said I was lying and later had my window
covered with a bag. I was yelling, kicking, screaming. I
couldn't control my actions at all it was the drug
effects I thought I was going to die in the cell I was in.
maintains that the cell was twenty degrees and that
“the floor was wet with urine that was not mine.”
He continues, “I kept screaming for help but no one
heard me I wanted medical attention but never received none
they left me in the cell I put myself in for 24 hours in
those conditions.” Plaintiff states that he had
“no mattress, no soap, no food, it was dirty and cold
and I just wanted to die in there I wanted to kill myself
cause it felt like that's what they were trying to do to
me.” He asserts, “I was neglected my right to
live in a clean envirnment was neglected and medical
attention I never received. Medical never stepped in and ask
me of my wishes either.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).