United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
William Lamb, pro se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. STIVERS, CHIEF JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (DN 6). The motion is ripe for adjudication. For the
reasons provided below, the motion is GRANTED.
September 13, 2014, Plaintiff William Lamb
(“Lamb”) was in a motor vehicle accident in
Warren County, Kentucky. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss
2, DN 6-1 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot. Dismiss]). Two
Defendants, Kentucky State Police Troopers Chad Smith
(“Trooper Smith”) and Joshua Amos (“Trooper
Amos”), were dispatched to the scene. (Defs.' Mot.
Dismiss 2). According to Lamb, when Troopers Smith and Amos
arrived, he instructed them that he had arranged for a
wrecking service to attend to his vehicle. (Compl. 4, DN 1).
Trooper Smith allegedly informed Lamb, over his objections,
that KSP's towing service would tow the vehicle instead.
(Compl. 4). After paramedics on the scene finished speaking
with Lamb, Troopers Smith and Amos asked Lamb for his
driver's license. (Compl. 4). Lamb alleges that he asked
the Troopers to articulate probable cause for requesting his
license, at which point Trooper Smith allegedly “put
his hands on [Lamb] good an[d] hard . . . .” (Compl.
4). According to Lamb, as he began to turn around, Troopers
Smith and Amos “football tackled” him and
arrested him for menacing. (Compl. 4).
way to the jail, the troopers allegedly drove dangerously
over the speed limit and persisted in asking Lamb questions
despite his invocation of the Fifth Amendment. (Compl. 4-5).
Lamb alleges that once he arrived at the jail, another
Defendant, Sergeant Jermaine Savage (“Sergeant
Savage”),  began to further question him about the
incident and cursed at him after Lamb refused to answer his
questions. (Compl. 5). After examining Lamb, a nurse at the
jail recommended that he be taken to the hospital because of
his heart rate and blood pressure. (Compl. 5). While being
transported to the hospital, Trooper Smith allegedly slammed
on the brakes in an attempt to cause Lamb's face to
strike the partition in the patrol car. (Compl, 5). At the
hospital, Sergeant Savage allegedly continued interrogating
Lamb and Trooper Smith threatened him with violence if Lamb
continued telling hospital staff what had happened. (Compl.
October 7, 2014, Lamb was arraigned in Warren District Court
and charged with having no operator's license, failing to
maintain required insurance, menacing, resisting arrest,
possessing a cancelled or fictitious operator's license,
and giving an officer a false name or address. (Defs.'
Mot. Dismiss Ex. B, at 6, DN 6-3). On August 11, 2017, Lamb
was convicted by a jury of all but the fictitious
operator's license charge and later sentenced to
forty-five days imprisonment on September 12, 2017.
(Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Ex. B, at 2-3).
filed his present suit on July 20, 2018, asserting claims of
assault and battery, false arrest, and theft of his vehicle,
and for the resulting forty-five-day jail sentence
recommended by the jury. (Compl. 6). Defendants have moved to
dismiss Lamb's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6) on
several grounds, including that Lamb's claims are
untimely and barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 2).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
complaint will be dismissed when it “fail[s] to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Considering motions under Rule
12(b)(6) requires the Court to construe the complaint in the
most favorable light for the nonmoving party, accepting
‘as true all factual allegations and permissible
inferences therein.'” Gazette v. City of
Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted). Though pleadings need not contain detailed factual
allegations, the nonmoving party must allege facts that when
“accepted as true . . . ‘state claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When a
plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court is to hold his pleadings
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers . . . .” Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (internal citation omitted).
Defendants may disagree with Lamb's rendition of events,
upon a motion to dismiss, the Court will accept as true
“all factual allegations and permissible
inferences” contained in the Complaint.
Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1064. Even assuming the truth of
Lamb's allegations, all his claims may nevertheless be
dismissed. First, Lamb's claims for assault, battery,
false arrest, and theft are time-barred under Kentucky's
one-year statute of limitations. See Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); KRS 413.140(1). Second,
Lamb's Section 1983 claim for his forty-five-day prison
sentence is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
Lamb's claims for assault, battery, false arrest, and
federal law does not otherwise provide for an applicable
state of limitations, constitutional claims asserted under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the statute of limitations
for personal injury actions in the state where the cause of
action occurred. Kato, 549 U.S. at 387. Under
Kentucky law, actions premised on personal injury, arrest,
and theft “shall ...