United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. MCKINLEY JR., DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Zackery Tyler Mings-Rucker filed the instant pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial
review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss some of
Plaintiff's claims and allow one claim to proceed for
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
states that he is a convicted inmate at the Hardin County
Detention Center (HCDC). He sues HCDC; Micheal Gunter,
identified as a corporal at HCDC; and Danny Allen, the HCDC
Jailer. He sues Defendant Gunter in his individual and
official capacities. He does not state in which capacity he
sues Defendant Allen. Construing the complaint broadly, as
the Court is required to do at this stage, the Court
construes the complaint as suing Defendant Allen in both his
individual and official capacities.
claim against Defendant Gunter
alleges that an incident occurred on September 3, 2018, where
he was subjected to excessive force by Defendant Gunter
resulting in serious injuries. The Court construes the
allegations as alleging excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
review, the Court will allow Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
claim for excessive force to proceed against Defendant Gunter
in his individual capacity. In allowing the claim to
proceed, the Court passes no judgment on its merit or
claim against Defendant Allen
names Jailer Allen as a Defendant but does not make any
reference to him in his statement of the claim. The Court,
therefore, construes the complaint as suing Defendant Allen
in his role as supervisor of Defendant Gunter. However, the
doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to
control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to
impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978); Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d
76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Rather, to establish
supervisory liability in a § 1983 action, “[t]here
must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly
participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff
must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly
authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.”
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citing Hays v.
Jefferson Cty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 872-74 (6th Cir.
1982)). Supervisory liability “must be based on active
unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a
mere failure to act.'” Shehee v. Luttrell,
199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Salehpour v.
Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)).
complaint makes no reference to Defendant Allen and therefore
fails to demonstrate that he encouraged any specific
incidents or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly, the
individual-capacity claim against Defendant Allen will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
capacity claims and ...