United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, PLAINTIFF
KSP MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, et al., DEFENDANTS
William J. Daugherty, pro se
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
matter is before the Court on Defendants Correct Care
Solutions and Dr. Shastine Tangilag's
(“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment, [R.
60]. Plaintiff William Daugherty responded, [R. 64], and
Defendants replied, [R. 66]. Fully briefed, this matter is
now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 60], is
Daugherty alleges that on November 22, 2015, he heard that
Dr. Tangilag “did not see color inmates or Hispanic
inmates . . . only Cacaucasions [sic] . . ..” [R. 17 at
6 (Third Amended Complaint).] That day, Daugherty alleges
that he went to see Dr. Tangilag on account of issues with
his diabetes, but Dr. Tangilag would not see him.
[Id.] In its previous Memorandum Opinion and Order,
the Court interpreted this as a Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim against Dr. Tangilag in both her official
and individual capacities. [R. 21 at 8.] Though, the Court
noted that Daugherty's official-capacity claim is
actually against her employer, Correct Care Solutions.
[Id. at 9.] Subsequently, Defendants CCS and Dr.
Tangilag filed the Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 60], that
is currently before the Court.
judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists
where “there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court “may not make
credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence when
determining whether an issue of fact remains for
trial.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d
714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Logan v. Denny's,
Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001); Ahlers v.
Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The
ultimate question is ‘whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.'” Back v. Nestlé USA,
Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
party moving for summary judgment, the defendant must
shoulder the burden of showing the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact as to at least one essential element
of the plaintiff's claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see
also Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Assuming the
defendant satisfies his or her burden of production, the
plaintiff “must-by deposition, answers to
interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file-show
specific facts that reveal a genuine issue for trial.”
Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
the Court acknowledges that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). The duty to be less stringent with pro
se complainants, however, “does not require [the
Court] to conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald
v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1979) (citation
omitted), nor to create a claim for a pro se
plaintiff, Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.1975).
it should be noted that “‘a verified complaint .
. . satisfies the burden of the nonmovant to respond' to
a motion for summary judgment, unlike ‘mere allegations
or denials' in unverified pleadings.” King v.
Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir.
1999)) (en banc).
make four arguments in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment: (1) Daugherty failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, (2) Daugherty's Fourteenth Amendment rights
were not violated, (3) Daugherty's claims are barred by
the applicable statute of limitations, and (4) Dr. Tangilag
and CCS are immune from suit in their official capacity.
[See generally R. 60-1 (Summary Judgment
Memorandum).] The Court agrees that Daugherty failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. Even if Daugherty exhausted
the available administrative remedies, the Court finds that
Daugherty still failed to show that the Defendants
purposefully discriminated against him in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in the interest of efficiency and
judicial economy, the Court does not find it necessary to
analyze the Defendants' latter two arguments at this
initial matter, the Court notes that on November 21, 2018,
the Court ordered Defendants to file appropriate
authentication of the grievance records and medical records
cited in their Motion for Summary Judgment. [R.82.] On
November 27, 2018, Defendants complied with this order. [R.
83.] Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Submit Grievance
and Medical Record Certifications, [R. 83], is GRANTED.
Failure to Exhaust ...