United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. McKinley Jr., District Judge United States District Court
the Court are the motion for reconsideration (DN 17) filed by
Defendant United States of America and the motion to dismiss
(DN 14) filed by Defendant Michael Wilson. Each will be
for reconsideration (DN 17)
complaint, Plaintiff, Jamal Bekhtyar, who is proceeding
pro se, alleged that Defendant Wilson, a U.S.
Probation Officer in the Middle District of Tennessee, was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical
need because Defendant Wilson failed to inform the U.S.
Marshal's Office and the U.S. Attorney's Office that
Plaintiff required antibiotics, rest, and follow-up medical
attention for a spider bite when Plaintiff was arrested by
the U.S. Marshal's Office. On initial review, the Court
allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to
name Defendant Wilson in his individual capacity. Plaintiff
did so (DN 11), and the Court allowed the Eighth/Fourteenth
Amendment claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
against Defendant Wilson to proceed.
motion for reconsideration, Defendant United States moves the
Court for reconsideration of its determination that Plaintiff
had alleged a constitutional claim against Defendant Wilson.
Defendant United States argues that since recovery against
Defendant Wilson would be from his personal assets, the Court
must reconsider its decision to prevent a manifest injustice.
Defendant United States further argues that within the second
amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to link Defendant Wilson
to a constitutional violation.
motions (DNs 20 and 22) for the Court to deny the
Defendants' motion to dismiss are effectively a response
to the motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff states that his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by all
Defendants; that the Court has liberally and correctly
construed his complaint; and that Defendants are not immune
to Plaintiff's claims of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical issue in violation of the Eighth and
courts will find justification for reconsidering
interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening change
of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health
& Welfare Fund, 89 Fed.Appx. 949, 959 (6th Cir.
2004). The Court will reconsider whether Plaintiff has stated
a constitutional claim against Defendant Wilson.
Sixth Circuit historically has analyzed Fourteenth Amendment
pretrial detainee claims and Eighth Amendment prisoner claims
“under the same rubric.” Villegas v. Metro.
Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir.
2013). “[A] prisoner's Eighth Amendment right is
violated when prison . . . officials are deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical
needs.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702
(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976)). “A deliberate indifference claim has
both objective and subjective components.” Alspaugh
v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011).
objective component mandates a sufficiently serious medical
need.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 Fed.Appx. 784,
787 (6th Cir. 2011). This Court will assume, and Defendant
does not argue otherwise, that Plaintiff's spider bite
was a sufficiently serious medical need so as to satisfy the
subjective component regards a prison official's state of
mind; the prison official must “be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390
F.3d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Defendant United States argues that
Plaintiff has not met the subjective prong because nothing
suggests that Defendant Wilson was aware of the lack of
medical care during Plaintiff's detention at Grayson
County Detention Center (GCDC) or that Defendant Wilson did
not himself believe that Plaintiff would receive adequate
care. Defendant United States argues that, even under a
liberal reading of the complaint, Plaintiff only sets forth a
negligence claim as to Defendant Wilson.
Court takes note of Defendant's argument that Defendant
Wilson could have reasonably believed that Plaintiff would in
fact receive medical attention at GCDC. Defendant United
States points to the fact that Defendant Wilson assured
Plaintiff that he would receive medical attention and to the
fact that when Defendant Wilson saw Plaintiff in court three
days later and realized that he had not received and needed
medical treatment Defendant Wilson “immediately”
had Plaintiff released to go to the hospital.
instant case is similar to a recent decision by this Court.
In Quintana v. Woosley, No. 4:18-CV-P95-JHM, 2018 WL
3487470, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 19, 2018), the plaintiff's
main complaint was that medical officials did not provide
treatment for his spider bite until one week after he let
them know about the bite through “word of mouth.”
This Court found the following:
“[A] short delay by itself in administering medical
treatment-even an unexplained delay-is not enough to
demonstrate deliberate indifference to . . . medical needs,
but instead evinces negligence.” See Barner v.
Mackie, No. 17-1608, 2017 WL 5633399, at *3 (6th Cir.
2017) (citing Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585,
592-93 (6th Cir. 2013)); see also Hood v. Johns, No.
5:11-CT-3072-FL, 2012 WL 3839987, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 5,
2012) (granting summary judgment against a plaintiff who
asserted that defendant prison guards had promised him
treatment for a brown recluse spider bite because in the
absence of any evidence suggesting that the guards