United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
TIRRELL T. BARBOUR Plaintiff
DANNY ALLEN, et al. Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge
a pro se prisoner civil rights action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted
Plaintiff Tirrell T. Barbour leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will dismiss some claims, allow others to
proceed, and allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated at Hardin County Detention Center
(HCDC). He brings this action against HCDC Jailer
Danny Allen, in both his official and individual capacities,
and against “[HCDC] Medical.”
complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows:
10-15-18 I sent a request to Mr. Danny Allen requesting a
transfer to a facility that would allow me to have my hernia
repaired due to the fact that my small intestines are hanging
out my scrotum and Medical denies me and says I should of
repaired it on the street. To my request on 10-15-18 Mr.
Allen stated since I brought drugs from Taylor Co. to Hardin
Co. I'm not going. Not only was I denied receiving
surgery though I was not detained for drugs or either was
there drugs on my personal possession of any kind, but yet I
still seam to receive inadequate medical care in Hardin Co.
from staff which leads to my next complaint.
10-17-18 I wrote a request to speak with him, still no
response, still not scanned. 10-15-18 Natasha Jones received
a phone call from Mr. Danny Allen and stated that I had
brought drugs to the institution, when I originated from
Hardin Co. transported to court from Hardin Co., seen a judge
in Taylor Co., then transported back to Hardin Co. I am not
married so that information that was passed on to Ms. Jones
was not only a lie but malicious and embarrassing not only to
me but my family and whatever information was fabricated from
within the facility was however confidential and no civilian
should have received this info from this established
gentleman and by the slandering of my name not only Ms. Jones
but my family has been hesitant to support me and now I
suffer from that false statement.
Medical authority still haven't set a surgery date and
said I should have had it repaired on the street even as
property of D.O.C.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and
injunctive relief in the form of “release to
probation” and the “expungement of [his]
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).