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Barbour v. Allen

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

December 19, 2018

DANNY ALLEN, et al. Defendants


          Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge

         This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff Tirrell T. Barbour leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss some claims, allow others to proceed, and allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint.


         Plaintiff is incarcerated at Hardin County Detention Center (HCDC).[1] He brings this action against HCDC Jailer Danny Allen, in both his official and individual capacities, and against “[HCDC] Medical.”

         In the complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows:

10-15-18 I sent a request to Mr. Danny Allen requesting a transfer to a facility that would allow me to have my hernia repaired due to the fact that my small intestines are hanging out my scrotum and Medical denies me and says I should of repaired it on the street. To my request on 10-15-18 Mr. Allen stated since I brought drugs from Taylor Co. to Hardin Co. I'm not going. Not only was I denied receiving surgery though I was not detained for drugs or either was there drugs on my personal possession of any kind, but yet I still seam to receive inadequate medical care in Hardin Co. from staff which leads to my next complaint.
10-17-18 I wrote a request to speak with him, still no response, still not scanned. 10-15-18 Natasha Jones received a phone call from Mr. Danny Allen and stated that I had brought drugs to the institution, when I originated from Hardin Co. transported to court from Hardin Co., seen a judge in Taylor Co., then transported back to Hardin Co. I am not married so that information that was passed on to Ms. Jones was not only a lie but malicious and embarrassing not only to me but my family and whatever information was fabricated from within the facility was however confidential and no civilian should have received this info from this established gentleman and by the slandering of my name not only Ms. Jones but my family has been hesitant to support me and now I suffer from that false statement.
Medical authority still haven't set a surgery date and said I should have had it repaired on the street even as property of D.O.C.

         As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the form of “release to probation” and the “expungement of [his] records.”


         When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

         Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         III. ...

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