FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE OLU A. STEVENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-005091
AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT: Karl Price Louisville,
AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE FRANKFORT AVENUE CHURCH OF
CHRIST: Patrick T. Schmidt Louisville, Kentucky.
BEFORE: J. LAMBERT, MAZE, AND SMALLWOOD, JUDGES.
Anthony, Trustee, appeals from an order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court which denied his writ for prohibition and/or
mandamus. Appellant sought to have the circuit court prohibit
the district court from enforcing an order and ordering it to
hold a contempt hearing. We find that the circuit court erred
in denying the writ, though not for the reasons set forth by
Appellant; therefore, we reverse and remand.
brought a forcible detainer action in the Jefferson District
Court against Reverend Billy Holt and the New Brighter Day
Baptist Church. Appellant sought a judgment of eviction for
the non-payment of rent. The property at issue is located at
427 M Street, Louisville, Kentucky. From what can be deduced
from the record and the briefs, the ownership of the property
is under dispute and Rev. Holt and his church began paying
rent to the Frankfort Avenue Church of Christ (hereinafter
referred to as Frankfort Avenue).
the commencement of the forcible detainer action, Frankfort
Avenue moved to intervene in order to make a claim of
ownership on the subject property. This motion was granted by
the district court. A trial was held and the district court
entered an order on August 15, 2017. The order found that
Rev. Holt and his church were guilty of forcible detainer and
ordered them to vacate the premises. The order also required
that Frankfort Avenue deliver to Appellant $8, 100 in rent it
had collected from Rev. Holt. Finally, the order required
that Frankfort Avenue return to Appellant any documents it
had obtained from Branch Banking & Trust pursuant to a
subpoena duces tecum.
later filed a contempt motion against Frankfort Avenue for
not turning over the rent payments. Frankfort Avenue then
filed a Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 59.05 motion to amend or
vacate the August order. A hearing was held on the CR 59.05
motion. The court ultimately amended its August order and
entered a new order on September 22, 2017. The new order only
changed one aspect of the previous order. The new order
required Frankfort Avenue to pay into the court the money
received in rent instead of paying it directly to Appellant.
The court would then hold the money for 30 days or until
Frankfort Avenue files an appeal or a circuit court action.
The court also denied the contempt motion because it had
modified its original order.
then filed the underlying writ. Appellant argued that CR
59.05 is inapplicable to forcible detainer actions and that
Frankfort Avenue's only recourse was to appeal the August
order within 7 days pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 383.255. Frankfort Avenue responded to the writ arguing
that CR 59.05 is applicable and that Appellant is not
entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a writ. The circuit
court denied the writ and held that the district court was
not acting outside its jurisdiction and that Appellant
"failed to establish irreparable harm will result if
this Court does not grant him relief." This appeal
properly analyze this case, we must look at both the writ
issue and the forcible detainer issue.
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing
that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed
outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an
application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower
court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although
within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy
by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable
injury will result if the petition is not granted.
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004)
(emphasis in original). We review the denial of a writ for
abuse of discretion. Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d
154, 158 (Ky. 2012).
"The remedy of forcible entry and detainer was evolved
from an English criminal proceeding and is not strictly a
common law action. It is regarded as a statutory action at
law to recover possession of real property . . . ."
McHugh v. Knippert, 243 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Ky. 1951).
As a special statutory proceeding, KRS 383.200-285 governs
the eviction process with its own unique procedural
requirements which "shall prevail over any inconsistent
procedures set forth in the Rules [of Civil Procedure]."
CR 1; See Baker v. Ryan, 967 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Ky.
App. 1997) (Holding that "the [forcible ...