United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, Pikeville
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Josheph M. Hood, Judge
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
of Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins. [DE 29]. Kentucky state
prisoner Donald Terry Bartley, proceeding pro se, filed a
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [DE 16]. A
magistrate judge conducted a preliminary review of
Bartley's claims and recommended that Bartley's
motion be denied with prejudice upon initial review. [DE 29].
Bartley objected to the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation. [DE 31].
considered the matter de novo, the Court adopts Magistrate
Judge Atkin's recommendation as its own because Bartley
did not automatically become entitled to parole after serving
twenty-five years of imprisonment. Additionally, Bartley has
failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to parole based on
the terms of a plea agreement. As such, Bartley's habeas
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is DENIED
Procedural and Factual Background
states that he “objects to the Magistrate Judge's
R&R in its entirety as to the characterization of the
sentence and the issues presented.” [DE 31 at 1, Page
ID # 447]. Still, Bartley does not object to the factual and
procedural background outlined in Magistrate Judge
Atkin's recommendation. In fact, Bartley appears to only
object to the Magistrate Judge's legal findings and
conclusions in Parts III(A) and III(B) of the Report and
Recommendation [DE 29]. [See DE 31]. As such, the Court
adopts the accurate procedural and factual recitation in
Judge Atkin's Report and Recommendation as its own. [DE
29 at 1-4, Page ID # 402-05].
Standard of Review
U.S.C. § 2254(d) states:
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
amended by AEDPA, Section 2254 “sets several limits on
the power of a federal court to grant an application for a
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.”
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
First, Section 2254(a) states that a federal court may
“entertain an application for a writ on habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” Section 2254(b) and (c) provide that,
subject to certain exceptions, a habeas petitioner must
exhaust state remedies.
petitioner carries the burden of proof. Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).
The Section 2254 standard is “difficult to meet,
” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102
(2011), and is a “highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, “review
under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.
habeas petitioner may object to a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). If the
petitioner objects, “The district judge must determine
de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“Only those specific objections to the magistrate's
report made to the district court will be preserved for
appellate review.” Carson v. Hudson, 421
Fed.Appx. 560, 563 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Souter v.
Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2005)).