United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
Rebecca Grady Jennings, United States District Court District
a pro se prisoner civil rights action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the
Court for screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss this action.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated at the Hardin County Detention Center (HCDC),
which he sometimes references as the Hardin County Jail
(HCJ). He names the HCJ as a Defendant in this action, as
well as HCJ Jailer Danny Allen and HCJ Captain R.S. Reynolds,
in their official capacities only.
complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows:
I'm a level 3 inmate being house at HCDC. I been told
that it up to DOC to put me at a Class D level 3 jail where I
can work and take class. DOC states it up to the Jailer to
send me to a level 3 class D jail . . . At HCDC I can only
take my NCRC which I have finish. I can't take recommend
programs . . . I also can't work at HCDC where I'm
not getting 4 days month work credit . . . I am a level 3
inmate do to a DVO. Classification score is 0. Org custody
level is a 2. Final custody level 3 due to DVO. The person
who put the DVO on me has past away . . . My class D charge
is AA-001 fleeing or evading police 1st degree on
foot. I have fill out several grievance form about these
issues and wrote DOC . . . DOC has told me it all should be
handled by HCDC.
attaches several documents to the complaint which appear to
show that he has in fact been assigned the custody level and
classification which he asserts and that he has filed
grievances related to the issues set forth in the complaint.
relief, Plaintiff seeks to “get work credit from
October 2017 and transferred to a Class D Level 3
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 ...