United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
James Faron Banard Jackson, filed a pro se, in
forma pauperis complaint. This case is before the Court
for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, this action
will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
is a convicted inmate housed at the Hardin County Detention
Center (HCDC). He names as Defendants the Hardin County
Attorney Office and, in their individual and official
capacities, Hardin County Attorneys Jennifer B. Oldham and
Don Jones. He states that he is a “man being murdered
to be framed for murders and other crimes need me dead to do
so.” He alleges that he has been entrapped by the
Hardin County Drug Task Force, the Elizabethtown Police, the
Hardin County Attorney's Office, Defendants, and others
“to scare me into taking a plea to keep me here as long
as possible.” He alleges that he is trapped “in a
huge arsenic conspiracy.” He references a letter
written in 2014 by his father, a retired Elizabethtown police
officer, in state criminal case “14-cr-00024”
stating that Plaintiff is a paranoid schizophrenic who is
“paranoid of everything and everybody.”
relief, Plaintiff asks for monetary and punitive damages and
injunctive relief in the form of being released from jail and
having his record expunged.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A
claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se
pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
complaint and its attachment contain many of the same
allegations and claims made by Plaintiff in two prior actions
recently dismissed by this Court, Jackson v. Hardin Cty.
Drug Task Force DEA et al., 3:18-cv-P88-CRS, and
Jackson v. Shane Young et al., 3:18-cv-P165-DJH.
This action will be dismissed for the same reasons.
Plaintiff, as he did in his prior two actions, again alleges
a vast conspiracy of various actors in Hardin County. He
asserts that his life is in danger and that he is trapped
“in a huge arsenic conspiracy.” He again
references the 2014 letter by his father in a state-court
criminal case purportedly stating that Plaintiff is a
paranoid schizophrenic who is “paranoid of everything
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009). Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
-- but it has not ‘show[n]' -- that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations
fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;
see also Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854
(6th Cir. 2003) (“‘It is well-settled that
conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of
specificity and that vague and conclusory allegations
unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state
such a claim under § 1983.'”) (quoting
Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir.
1987)). Plaintiff's complaint contains only sweeping and
conclusory allegations of a vast conspiracy against him,
suggesting no more than the mere possibility that any
Defendant has acted unlawfully. For these reasons,
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
any § 1983 action challenging the validity of a
state-court conviction is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under the Heck
doctrine, a state prisoner may not file a § 1983 suit
for damages or equitable relief challenging his conviction or
sentence if a ruling on his claim would render the conviction
or sentence invalid, until and unless the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
Executive Order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has
been called into question by a federal court's issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state
prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation -- no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's
suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings) -- if success in that action would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to challenge his
state-court conviction or sentence by asking for release from
imprisonment and expungement of his record, he may only do so
through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. “A state
prisoner's immediate or speedier release from
incarceration is available only under § 2254, not §
1983.” Sisson v. Commonwealth of Ky., No.
4:10CV-P7-M, 2010 WL 715840, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2010).