United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
N. Stivers, Chief Judge.
Jeremy Bell, a convicted prisoner incarcerated in Northpoint
Training Center, filed a pro se complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Jamestown,
Kentucky (DN 1). On initial review of the complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (DN 11), the Court dismissed the
claims against the City of Jamestown but provided Plaintiff
with an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint (DN 13), which is currently before
the Court on initial review pursuant to § 1915A. For the
reasons that follow, the instant action will be dismissed.
amended complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants the
Jamestown Police Department, Jamestown Police Officer Tracy
Irvin in her individual capacity, and Russell Springs Police
Officer Nathan Bradshaw in his individual capacity. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Irvin and Bradshaw went to his place
of work “and told me that I needed to come with them.
They placed me in the back of the police car and took me to
the Jamestown Police Department for interrogation. This
incident had occured on or about August 20, 2011.” He
claims, “[w]hen [Defendants] had interrogated me,
the[y] placed me in the Russell County Detention
Center.” He further claims that on or about August 30,
2011, Defendants “seized my cell phone and various
other items without filing a search warrant and an affidavit
of search warrant with the Russell Circuit Court.”
to Plaintiff, after the “illegal seizure, ” he
was charged with “sodomy 2ndDegree” in
Criminal Action No. 11-CR-00095, and “coerced into
signing a plea agreement.” He reports that he filed
motions with the Russell Circuit Court claiming illegal
arrest, search, and seizure but that the motions were denied.
He also reports filing a motion to alter and/or amend final
judgment and RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 motions, all of which
were denied as well. He states that one count of sodomy had
been dismissed but does not indicate when.
relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages and an
injunction “barr[ing] the officers from official
prisoner seeks relief against governmental entities,
officers, and/or employees, the trial court must review the
complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1),
(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett
v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d
461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or
‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Jamestown Police Department
Jamestown Police Department is not a “person”
subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal
departments, such as police departments, are not suable under
§ 1983. Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049
(6th Cir. 1994); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117,
120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not
be sued under § 1983). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to
state a claim against the Jamestown Police Department, and
the claims against that Defendant will be dismissed.
Officers Irvin and Bradshaw
1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations period,
but it is well settled that constitutional claims asserted
under § 1983 are governed by the state personal injury
statute of limitations. Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227,
233 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 280 (1985)). Personal injury actions in Kentucky
“shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of action accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1);
Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182
(6th Cir. 1990).
the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state
law, the “date on which the statute of limitations
begins to run in a § 1983 action is a question of
federal law.” Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep't of
Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (2007) (citing
Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516,
519 (6th Cir. 1997)). “[I]t is the standard rule that
accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present
cause of action . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file
suit and obtain relief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 388 (2007) ...