United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
JEFFERY TYRONE EDMONDSON JR. PLAINTIFF
MARK MEREDITH DEFENDANT
H. McKinley, Jr., District Judge.
matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff
Jeffery Tyrone Edmondson Jr.'s pro se complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will dismiss the instant action.
is an inmate at the Hardin County Detention Center. He brings
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mark Meredith,
Director of Dismas Charities, Inc. St. Ann (Dismas).
claims that on March 2, 2018, he entered Dismas in
Louisville, Kentucky, and that on March 27, 2018, he was
terminated from the program “due to some residents
saying I violated Cardinal Rules. The violation was that I
acted out in violence towards another
resident.” Plaintiff alleges that he “was a
target since the first day I got there” and that the
following constitutional rights were violated while at
Dismas: “freedom of speech, my rights as a black man to
be treated as a equal. My right to voice my opinion on issues
that were going on in the community.” He asserts,
“I was forced to lie on other residents, just so I
wouldn't get in trouble. I was lied on by the residents
plus the Director, upon a situation that didn't
occure.” He continues, “I was terminated from
this program without a proper investigation. So my freedom
was taken away on a here say of residents that has a problem
with me.” Plaintiff claims:
All of this occured after I went to my counselor Mr. Michael
Edwards a week or so prier to the accusuation of my actions
that was said I did. I also talked to counselor Mr. Bush . .
. a long with Assistant Director Mr. David Meek. I begged
them all to do something about it, but it never got done, the
situation got worse, which led to me being back incarcarated
for no reason. . . . I am wrongfully incarcarated due to the
fact of lies.”
contends that the “Director is racist, most of all the
residents is racist as well. They targetted all the blacks
and the ones who was hanging out with us.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, the trial court must
review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the court determines that it is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
does not specify in which capacity he is bringing this action
against Defendant Meredith. Individual-capacity “suits
seek to impose personal liability upon a government official
for actions he takes under color of state law.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
“Official-capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.'”
Id. at 166 (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
“[Section] 1983 plaintiffs must clearly notify
defendants of the potential for individual liability.”
Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 773 (6th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). “When a § 1983 plaintiff
fails to affirmatively plead capacity in the complaint, we
then look to the course of proceedings” to ascertain
whether the defendant has been notified of the potential for
personal liability. Id.
Court finds that the complaint fails to indicate that
Plaintiff intends to impose individual liability on Defendant
Meredith, and none of Plaintiff's other filings pertain
to that issue. Because official-capacity suits are against
“‘an entity of which an officer is an agent,
'” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 ...