United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
KARL ARCHIBALD, JR. PLAINTIFF
WARREN COUNTY REGIONAL JAIL DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge.
a pro se prisoner civil rights action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the
Court for screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
allow some claims to proceed, dismiss others, and allow
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Karl Archibald, Jr., is a federal pretrial detainee
incarcerated at the Warren County Regional Jail (WCRJ). He
names WCRJ as the sole Defendant in this action.
complaint, Plaintiff first claims that his rights are being
violated because he is not allowed to “freely
exercise” his religion because he is not allowed to
wear his Islamic “coofi”outside of his cell. He also
alleges that, during Ramadan, he was served unpackaged food
prepared by other inmates. Plaintiff indicates that his
Ramadan diet consisted of “green apple; (2) bologna
sandwiches; Lay potato chips, open cup of lettuce. Breakfast:
Peanut Butter spread in Styrofoam tray to pieces of lite
bread, and green apple, and packaged flavor aid.”
Plaintiff also states that he did not he did not receive
breakfast or dinner for two days during Ramadan. Plaintiff
further states that he asked “to get off their belief
of practice for Ramadan, ” but was told that his
“request to come off their belief of Ramadan practices
weren't to go in until weekday.” Plaintiff attaches
to the complaint a grievance he filed related to his diet
concerns. In this grievance, Plaintiff states he that is not
being fed at the proper time, that his food has been touched
by numerous people, and that he does not get “hot food
like [he] should.” He writes “they only give me
two sack lunches.” A jail official seemingly responded
as follows to Plaintiff's grievance: “Jail
standards require 2400 calories per day. Ramadan requires
fasting from sun-up to sun-down. Inmate did not turn in
request to be removed from Ramadan.” In what appears to
be Plaintiff's reply to this response, he writes:
“Nothing was said or done about religious bias or
disrespect.” Plaintiff next alleges that his rights
have been violated because he has not been seen by a nurse
practitioner even though he needs mental health medication
and has sores on his face, which cause swelling, bleeding,
and difficulty sleeping. He states that he has filed several
medical requests and that he is always told that he is on
“the list” to see the nurse practitioner.
also claims that his rights are being violated because he
does not have access to an updated law library and because he
is not allowed to “copy discovery on CD to paper”
so he can have hard copies in his cell to study. In addition,
he states that he has made several requests for a notary but
that these requests have been denied.
his complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that he has filed
grievances regarding his various issues at WCRJ but that he
has never received responses. He writes that the grievances
at WCRJ “seem to disappear.” As relief, Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive
relief in the form of release from detention and “28
U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, and 2255.”
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim
will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
WCRJ is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.
1994). Rather, the claims against it are actually against
Warren County as the real party in interest. Id.
(“Since the Police Department is not an entity which
may be sued, Jefferson ...