Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Barfield v. Storzan

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

October 15, 2018

SAMUEL SHARRON BARFIELD, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN STORZAN et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          DAVID J. HALE, JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Samuel Sharron Barfield filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. The complaint is now before the Court for initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action upon screening.

         I.

         Plaintiff, identifying himself as a convicted inmate at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), sues John Storzan, whom he identifies as a Registered Nurse at LMDC; an “Unknown Correctional Officer” at LMDC; and LMDC Director Mark Bolton. Plaintiff sues each Defendant in his individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff states the following:
Approximately July 12, 2017, RN [illegible] Nurse John Storzan and a unknown officer came to my cell called me to the door the officer stood with me while RN J. Storzan went to a door down the hallway returned with a small paper cup with to pills in side and told me to take them after 3 hours I became very sick with diarrhea and throwing up for around 4 days until I was called to see doctor for something else which at this time I ask him had he give or prescribed me anything he said no I told what had happen and there was nothing he could do about the situation.

         Plaintiff attached to his complaint a page titled, “Separate Memorandum” in which he lists the legal claims he is asserting against each Defendant. Against Defendant Storzan, Plaintiff states that he is alleging “medical malpractice, personal injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, mental cruelty, [and] cruel and unusual punishment . . . .” Against the Defendant unknown officer, he alleges “harassment, personal injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, mental cruelty, [and] cruel and unusual punishment . . . .” Against Defendant Bolton, Plaintiff alleges “failure to properly supervise medical staff, failure to properly supervise correctional officers, lack of oversight, personal injury, pain and suffering, mental cruelty, mental anguish, [and] cruel and unusual punishment.”

         As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.

         II.

         When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

         Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jxabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         III.

         Federal ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.