United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
J. HALE, JUDGE.
Samuel Sharron Barfield filed the instant pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. The complaint is now before the Court for
initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the
reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action upon
identifying himself as a convicted inmate at the Louisville
Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), sues John Storzan,
whom he identifies as a Registered Nurse at LMDC; an
“Unknown Correctional Officer” at LMDC; and LMDC
Director Mark Bolton. Plaintiff sues each Defendant in his
individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff states the following:
Approximately July 12, 2017, RN [illegible] Nurse John
Storzan and a unknown officer came to my cell called me to
the door the officer stood with me while RN J. Storzan went
to a door down the hallway returned with a small paper cup
with to pills in side and told me to take them after 3 hours
I became very sick with diarrhea and throwing up for around 4
days until I was called to see doctor for something else
which at this time I ask him had he give or prescribed me
anything he said no I told what had happen and there was
nothing he could do about the situation.
attached to his complaint a page titled, “Separate
Memorandum” in which he lists the legal claims he is
asserting against each Defendant. Against Defendant Storzan,
Plaintiff states that he is alleging “medical
malpractice, personal injury, pain and suffering, mental
anguish, mental cruelty, [and] cruel and unusual punishment .
. . .” Against the Defendant unknown officer, he
alleges “harassment, personal injury, pain and
suffering, mental anguish, mental cruelty, [and] cruel and
unusual punishment . . . .” Against Defendant Bolton,
Plaintiff alleges “failure to properly supervise
medical staff, failure to properly supervise correctional
officers, lack of oversight, personal injury, pain and
suffering, mental cruelty, mental anguish, [and] cruel and
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jxabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).