United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge United States District Court
a pro se civil rights action brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court for
screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss this action.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Bryant Anthony Basham is incarcerated at Daviess County
Detention Center (DCDC). He names Robby Burns, a DCDC shift
supervisor, and Shawn Wethington, a DCDC corrections officer,
as Defendants in their individual capacities.
In his complaint, Plaintiff makes the following allegations:
On 10-29-2017 at approximately 5:40 a.m. I county inmate
Bryant Anthony Basham was placed in cell B-190 with state
inmate  inside hole by [Defendant] Wethington a correction
officer who was asked to do so by shift supervisor Robby
Burns as soon as Mr. Worthington left the cell state inmate
 found out I come from a protective custody cell and was
offer $20 dollars to beat me up.
State inmate  started punching me in the face and back of
head and I put my hand over my head to protect my temples and
I felt a hard object slam into my left hand, x-ray results
showed fracture to my 4th metacarpal, swelling to
soft tissue associated to fracture, I also suffered bloody
nose and redness to head and face and bruising to left hand
Soft cast was put on left hand, I had to go outside to
hospital for x-rays and cast . . . . It is a violation to
house county inmates with state inmates in a two man cell.
Due to me being a county inmate who received physical
injuries from a state inmate I'm filing this lawsuit.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).