United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
CLIFTON C. WILLIAMS IV, Plaintiff,
HAROLD GLASS et al., Defendants.
J. Hale, Judge
Clifton C. Williams IV filed the instant pro se
action. This matter is now before the Court on
initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Upon initial screening of the
complaint, the instant action will be dismissed for the
reasons that follow.
filed his complaint on the Court-approved complaint form for
filing a civil case. Plaintiff names the following two
Defendants: Harold Glass, the “Owner/Manager” of
Stormy Realty; and the “Jefferson County
Sheriffs” identifying the job or title
“Compliance Officer (eviction).” Where the
complaint form asks the filer to state the basis for this
Court's jurisdiction, Plaintiff checked the box for
federal-question jurisdiction. In the portion of the form
where the filer is to list the specific federal statutes or
constitutional provisions at issue, Plaintiff states,
“That the Defendant did not follow specific procedure
for pursuiant to (PTFA) 2009/as well improper consideration
for persons with disabilities.” Plaintiff did not check
the box for diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. However,
in the “Amount in Controversy” section of the
form, he states, “Said eviction also included, illegal
removal of said Plaintiff property (2015 Nissan Versa)
household furniture 29, 500 roughly.” As his statement
of the claim, Plaintiff states the following:
Said Defendant was informed of a vehicle that was left on the
property 2801 Preston Hwy #2 in a back parking area the
defendant did not notify any resident of his decision the
vehicle to be towed. Then the eviction process was performed,
however upon ceasing the property not a notice was delivered
by the sheriff's office, the defendant entered the
dwelling prior to any representative present from the
sheriffs department. No. tresspassing notice was not issued
and the plaintiff's personal property was not cordin off
or properly labeled by the Jefferson County Sheriffs office
and said plaintiff lost signifigantly [sic] most of said
“Relief” section of the complaint form, Plaintiff
states, “Mr. Glass refused to make any accommodations
for the plaintiff's mental disabilities. Never notified
tenants as to entry into said dwelling and because of this
lack of procedure the plaintiff lost all of their personal
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this
Court must review the instant action. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e); McGore, 114 F.3d at 608-09. Upon review,
the Court must dismiss a case at any time if it determines
that an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This Court
recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972);
Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991).
However, the duty “does not require us to conjure up
unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
basis for this Court's jurisdiction, Plaintiff points to
the PTFA. The Court presumes that Plaintiff is referring to
the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009.
“Congress enacted the PTFA as a temporary measure
during the mortgage foreclosure crisis. The PTFA protects
tenants who reside in properties that are subject to
foreclosure by imposing certain obligations on successors in
interest to foreclosed properties.” Mik v. Fed.
Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 157 (6th Cir.
2014). “The PTFA requires successors in interest to
provide bona fide tenants with 90 days' notice to vacate
and to allow bona fide tenants to occupy the premises until
the end of their lease term unless certain conditions are
fails to allege how the PTFA applies to his claim or that he
was evicted because he resided in a property that was subject
to foreclosure. In any event, the PTFA expired on December
31, 2014. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
2204 (2010) (setting date of expiration); Maggiore v.
Leonard, No. 5:16-cv-340, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58039,
at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 2, 2016) (citing Fairview Tasman LLC
v. Young, No. 15-CV-05493-LHK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5653, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2016) (finding that party
could not assert claims under PTFA where alleged violations
occurred after the Act's expiration)). While Plaintiff
does not state the date the ...