United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. HALE, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Battle was arrested and charged with trespassing at Cash
Saver, a grocery store owned by Defendant Buehler, LLC
(hereinafter Cash Saver). She alleges that she lost her job
as a result of the arrest and criminal charge, and she
asserts claims of malicious prosecution and false
arrest/imprisonment against the security guard who arrested
her, Walter Parr. She also seeks to hold Cash Saver
vicariously liable for Parr's actions. (Docket No. 1)
Cash Saver has moved to dismiss all federal claims to which
it is subject (D.N. 5); Parr seeks dismissal of all claims
asserted against him. (D.N. 10) For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will deny Cash Saver's motion and grant
in part and deny in part Parr's motion.
following facts are set out in the complaint and accepted as
true for purposes of the present motions. Hill v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th
Cir. 2005). In August 2016, Battle shopped at First Choice
Market, a grocery store where Parr worked as a security
guard. (D.N. 1, PageID # 3) Parr was also employed as a
correctional officer at Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections (LMDC). (Id., PageID # 2) While
shopping, Battle engaged in a contentious cellphone
conversation. (Id., PageID # 2-3) Parr told Battle
to “watch her mouth” and not to come back to
First Choice Market. (Id.)
next month, First Choice Market went out of business and was
replaced by Cash Saver, a new grocery store operating in the
same location which also employed Parr as a security guard.
(Id., PageID # 1, 3) On September 28, 2016, while
her friend was grocery shopping at Cash Saver, Battle waited
outside of an adjoining business. (Id., PageID # 4)
Parr, wearing his LMDC uniform, told Battle that she was not
supposed to be on the property and that she was under arrest.
(Id.) Battle believed Parr was acting as a
correctional or police officer. (Id.) When the
Louisville Metro Police Department arrived, Parr told the
police officers that Battle was under arrest for trespassing.
(Id., PageID # 5) Battle was booked and incarcerated
for several hours at LMDC. (Id.) Her incarceration
caused her to be absent from work, and she was terminated due
to her pending criminal charge. (Id.) The charge was
ultimately dismissed on January 9, 2017. (Id.)
asserts four claims against Parr: (i) false arrest under
§ 1983, (ii) malicious prosecution under § 1983,
(iii) malicious prosecution under Kentucky common law, and
(iv) false imprisonment/arrest under Kentucky common law.
(Id., PageID # 5-8) Additionally, Battle asserts a
respondeat superior claim against Cash Saver. (Id.,
PageID # 8)
CASH SAVER'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Saver asks the Court to dismiss the “federal
claims” to which it is subject. (D.N. 5, PageID # 19)
As Battle points out, however, she asserted no federal claims
against Cash Saver. (D.N. 6, PageID # 25) Rather,
Battle's respondeat superior claim relates only to the
Kentucky common law claims against Parr for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment/arrest. (Id.)
Accordingly, Cash Saver's motion to dismiss will be
denied as moot.
PARR'S MOTION TO DISMISS
seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim with respect to
all four claims against him. (D.N. 10, PageID # 36) To
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet
this standard, a plaintiff must “plead factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. This requires the plaintiff to
present enough factual matter to support each element of each
claim. Id.; see also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 435 (6th Cir. 1988).
evaluating whether this pleading standard has been satisfied,
the Court must “accept all the [plaintiff's]
factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the [plaintiff].”
Hill, 409 F.3d at 716. The Court may consider
“matters of public record, orders, items appearing in
the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the
complaint” in addition to the complaint itself.
Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1554
(6th Cir. 1997). Moreover, “documents that a defendant
attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the
pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's
complaint and are central to her claim.” Weiner v.
Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys.
Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)).