United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
DEMETRIUS M. CLAYTON PLAINTIFF
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court
Demetrius M. Clayton filed the instant pro se 28
U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court on the initial
review of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon
review of the complaint, the Court will dismiss some of
Plaintiff's claims and give him the opportunity to amend
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
identifies himself as a pretrial detainee at the Hardin
County Detention Center (HCDC). He sues Southern Health
Partners and Carmen Blackburn, whom he identifies as a
“medical staff administrator” at HCDC, in her
individual and official capacities.
alleges that when he entered HCDC on January 25, 2018, he
“informed HCDC of all allergies.” In a claim
which he begins “Medical Malpractice, ” Plaintiff
states he was given medication which he is allergic to. He
states, “Ibuprofen, Tylonal, Naproxen, all of them;
I'm allergic to, Insaids.” He maintains,
“They have had copies of my medical records since 2014
from U of L outpatient . . . .” He states, “I was
denied my right, to refuse medical treatment, or be put in
the hole.” Plaintiff continues, “Approximately on
2-2-18 around 10:30 pm I fell down, in medical pod, from
abdominal pain, and burning in gut. Other inmates got medical
staff, they allowed me to lay in door of my cell; because
they thought I was joking.” He states, “Upon
seeing blood discharge from rectum around 11 pm. Then I was
taken seriously. At approximately 11:30 I was taken to HMH
hospital in Hardin County, and dis charged approximately
around 2:30 am on 2-3-18.” Plaintiff maintains,
“Naproxen was believed to be the cause of my bleeding.
Due to medical conditions on file Chron's; and ulcertive
colitis. Insaids are known to cause bleeding in patient with
these conditions.” He states that he was returned to
the medical pod.
second claim which Plaintiff begins “Unlawful
Detainment, ” he states, “On 2-3-18 at
approximately 11:30 am to 12:00 pm I was moved from medical
pod to Isolation, by medical staff, with no displinary
reports, verbal out burst or physical out burst.” He
continues, “Upon asking Lt. Motler stated she did not
know why I was moved to Isolation by medical. Later was
stated I was moved to Isolation cell 122 for blood comeing
out of rectum as medical observation. Was never checked on by
medical staff.” Plaintiff further states that he
“spent 20 hours in Isolation and was took back to
medical pod 165 cell 174, an was told by Classification at
jail; thats medical observation. Pod 165, located inside
[HCDC] medical facilities which all lead to emotional
relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages and other relief in
the form of “Miniumal 30 day suspension without
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See
§§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). When determining whether a plaintiff has
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court
must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true.
Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424
(6th Cir. 2002).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).