United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
B. Russell, Senior Judge.
a pro se civil rights action brought by a convicted
prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff Willis Latroy Gossett leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court
for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the
reasons set forth below, this action will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated at the Fulton County Detention Center (FCDC).
He brings this action against Fulton County Deputy Sheriff
David Thomas in his official capacity.
alleges that on October 9, 2010, he was walking down a street
in Fulton, Kentucky when Defendant Thomas “turn[ed] on
his blue lights and pull[ed] behind [a] vehicle.”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thomas told him that he had
been following the vehicle for “15 mins.”
Plaintiff states that Defendant Thomas then asked him
“what he was doing in Fulton selling drugs and if I
knew the individual that was in the vehicle.” Plaintiff
When I said no, he ask why was I approaching the vehicle,
when I said I was not approaching the vehicle, then
[Defendant] Thomas ask if he could search me and when I ask
him why and refused and stated that I hadn't done
anything wrong. At this point [Defendant] Thomas intimidated
me with the power of authority and threaten to call for
back-up and a drug dog if I did not agree to a search, with
the intimidation of [Defendant] Thomas being illegally
detained and threaten I reluctantly agreed to a search
incriminating myself under the influence of Intimidation of
Authority in which I feel that was a violation of the
4th Amendment of the Constitution of unduly
prolonged detention while waiting arrival of a drug sniffing
then writes that he believes his rights were violated on
October 9, 2010, because Defendant Thomas “profile me
as a drug dealer” and “illegally search seize
evidence that would incriminate me.” Plaintiff also
claims that his rights were violated because he “was
not the intended target, but was detained before the suspect
that [Defendant Thomas] had followed for 15 mins” and
because Plaintiff “was not approaching the vehicle nor
did [he] know the individual that was in the vehicle it was a
corner that we happen to approach at the same time.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “relief of
my charges and clear my record.”
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 ...