United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
DAVID A. QUINTANA PLAINTIFF
JASON WOOSLEY et al. DEFENDANTS
H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge.
a pro se civil rights action brought by a pretrial
detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff David A. Quintana leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
set forth below, this action will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Grayson County
Detention Center (GCDC). He brings this action against GCDC
Jailer Jason Woosley, in both his official and individual
capacities, and the “medical staff” at GCDC.
complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows:
On or about Oct. 19, 2017 as a federal pretrial detainee
while laying on the floor at [GCDC] Plaintiff was bit by a
brown spider with a mark near its head. Plaintiff contacted
the staff through medical request word of mouth and it took
about a week before staff looked into Plaintiff medical
complaint wich at this time violated Plaintiff's United
States Constitutional Rights (Eighth Amendment - Cruel and
Unusual Punishment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process) but
this time what seemed to be a skin ulcer has got bigger. They
started that Plaintiff on antibiotics that did not help.
Plaintiff continued to complain and exhaust all remedies. So
GCDC continued with shots of antibiotic continue to get
larger and pain was beginning to be untolerable. About two
weeks has passed and Plaintiff was seen by a outside doctor
that come to GCDC to look at Plaintiff skin ulcer and at that
time Doctor lanced the ulcer and what seemed to be infected
and was taken out through the procedure. Getting bit by a
spider has caused mental anguish and caused Plaintiff to have
symptoms of arentiaphobia everytime a spider is seen. Being
bit by this spider and with the GCDC acting under the color
of law (which is a federal offence to deprive or conspire to
deprive a person from ther constitatinal right) has now
injured me and have created bodily injury physical damage to
a person body by allowing this spider bite to cause a deep
skin ulcer that is possibly fetal. I pray that all executive
administrators see fits for this 1983 pro-se to be accepted
in the courts and that the responsible is held accountable
for their actions.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim
will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Sixth Circuit has historically analyzed Fourteenth Amendment
pretrial detainee claims and Eighth Amendment prisoner claims
“under the same rubric.” Villegas v. Metro.
Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir.
2013). “[A] prisoner's Eighth Amendment
right is violated when prison doctors or officials are
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious
medical needs.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A deliberate indifference claim
“has both ...