United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court
matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff
Jeremy Bell's pro se complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court
will dismiss the claims against the City of Jamestown and
provide Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
is a convicted inmate currently incarcerated in Northpoint
Training Center. He brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the City of Jamestown, Kentucky.
claims that he was at work “in the City of Jamestown
when the Jamestown Police came to his work place and told the
plaintiff that he had to come with them” and that
“[t]he officer had placed the plaintiff in the police
car and took him to the police station for
interrogation.” Plaintiff further claims that the
“Jamestown Police had no arrest warrant for the
plaintiff to have him placed in the police car let alon[e]
they [had] no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.”
Additionally, Plaintiff claims that “the Jamestown
Police and other police officers had obtained a search
warrant ten (10) days after the plaintiff was lodged in the
[Russell County] detention center. The officer's had
taken several of the plaintiffs belongings as well as other
various items.” He claims that the “search
warrant and affidavit of search warrant was never filed
within the court. Thus making the search warrant
subpoena form attached to Plaintiff's complaint, he
references Russell Circuit Court No. 11-CR-0095.
alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and of Section Ten of the Kentucky Constitution.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
prisoner seeks relief against governmental entities,
officers, and/or employees, the trial court must review the
complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1),
(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
§ 1983 claim is made against a municipality, such as the
City of Jamestown, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff's harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the
municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120
(1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at
691; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,
1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “[T]he touchstone of
‘official policy' is designed ‘to distinguish
acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make
clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which
the municipality is actually responsible.'”
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138
(1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
479-80 (1986)). To demonstrate municipal liability, a
plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the ...