United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
OPINION AND ORDER
Robert
E. Wier United States District Judge
Jeffrey
Kidd appeals the Commissioner's denial of his application
for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security
Income (collectively, “benefits”). The parties
filed dueling summary judgment motions. For the reasons that
follow, the Court GRANTS the
Commissioner's motion (DE #18) and
DENIES Kidd's motion (DE #15).
Claimant's mostly process-based complaints have no merit,
and the Commissioner properly applied relevant legal
standards in denying Kidd benefits via a substantiated
ruling.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kidd is
currently 57 years old. See, e.g., R. at 44. He
alleges disability beginning on December 18, 2012.
See R. at 190. Kidd applied for benefits in late
2014. R. at 184-93. The SSA denied his claims initially on
March 12, 2015, see R. at 117-20, and upon
reconsideration on April 24, 2015. See R. at 124-26.
Kidd then filed a written request for a hearing on April 29,
2015. R. at 138-39. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Bonnie
Kittinger held a hearing on the application on October 14,
2016. R. at 39-66. At the hearing, Kidd testified; Gregory
Schmitt represented him. R. at 42-60. Impartial vocational
expert (VE) Martha Goss[1] also testified. R. at 60-65. The
ALJ subsequently denied Kidd's claims on January 10,
2017. R. at 11-23. The Appeals Council denied review and thus
upheld the ALJ's decision on September 6, 2017. R. at
1-3.
The ALJ
made several particular findings in the required sequence.
She determined that Kidd did not engage in substantial
gainful activity from December 18, 2012, through January 10,
2017, the date of decision. R. at 14. The ALJ next determined
that Kidd has two severe impairments. Id. However,
ALJ Kittinger then found that Kidd did “not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that [met] or
medically equal[ed] the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.”
R. at 15. The ALJ further made a detailed residual functional
capacity (RFC) finding. R. at 17-20. Although ALJ Kittinger
found Kidd “unable to perform any of his past relevant
work, ” the ALJ determined that “there are jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that [Kidd] can perform[.]” R. at 20-22. Based on all
these considerations, the ALJ ruled that Kidd was not
“under a disability . . . from December 18, 2012,
through the date of th[e] decision, ” January 10, 2017.
R. at 22. Unsatisfied with the result of the SSA's
administrative process, Kidd turned to federal district court
for review.
11.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The
Court has carefully read the ALJ's decision, the
administrative hearing transcript, and the entire
administrative record. Judicial review of the ALJ's
decision to deny disability benefits is a limited and
deferential inquiry into whether substantial evidence
supports the denial's factual decisions and whether the
ALJ properly applied relevant legal standards. Blakley v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir.
2009); Jordan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d
417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008); Brainard v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427
(1971)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing
and defining judicial review for Social Security claims)
(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive[.]”).
Substantial
evidence means “more than a scintilla of evidence, but
less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health &
Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); see
also Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387,
390 (6th Cir. 2004). The Court does not try the case de
novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or assess
questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d
506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). Similarly, the Court does not
reverse findings of the Commissioner or the ALJ merely
because the record contains evidence-even substantial
evidence-to support a different conclusion. Warner,
375 F.3d at 390. Rather, the Court must affirm the ALJ's
decision if substantial evidence supports it, even if the
Court might have decided the case differently if in the
ALJ's shoes. See Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Her v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir.
1999).
The
ALJ, when determining disability, conducts a five-step
analysis. See Preslar v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). At Step 1, the ALJ considers whether
the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity.
See Preslar, 14 F.3d at 1110. At Step 2, the ALJ
determines whether one or more of the claimant's
impairments are severe. Id. At Step 3, the ALJ
analyzes whether the claimant's impairments, alone or in
combination, meet or equal an entry in the Listing of
Impairments. Id. At Step 4, the ALJ determines RFC
and whether the claimant can perform past relevant work.
Id. The inquiry at this stage is whether the
claimant can still perform that type of work, not necessarily
the specific past job. See Studaway v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir.
1987). Finally, at Step 5, when the burden shifts to the
Commissioner, if the claimant cannot perform past relevant
work, the ALJ determines whether significant numbers of other
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can
perform, given the applicable RFC. See Preslar, 14
F.3d at 1110; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ
determines at any step that the claimant is not disabled, the
analysis ends at that step. Mowery v. Heckler, 771
F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 1985); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4).
When
reviewing the ALJ's application of the legal standards,
the Court gives deference to her interpretation of the law
and reviews the decision for reasonableness and consistency
with governing statutes. Whiteside v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1289, 1292 (6th Cir. 1987).
In a Social Security benefits case, the agency's
construction of the statute should be followed “unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong.”
Merz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 969
F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Whiteside,
834 F.2d at 1292).[2]
B.
The ALJ did not reversibly err in Step 5.
Kidd's
sole, overarching argument (though it has various subparts)
is that the ALJ “erred in relying on vocational expert
testimony to fulfill his [sic] step 5 burden [3] without
adequately addressing Plaintiff's post-hearing evidence
and objections challenging the vocational expert's
testimony.” DE #16, at 1.[4] Kidd says that,
post-ALJ-hearing, he filed a memorandum, along with
“several exhibits, ” that are purportedly
“facially relevant to the issue of the ALJ's step 5
burden.” Id. at 4. He contends that Judge
Kittinger improperly “failed to acknowledge, let alone
address” these materials. Id. Claimant labels
this alleged procedural treatment “clear error,
requiring remand.” Id. The Acting Commissioner
generally responds that the “ALJ reasonably relied on
the vocational expert's testimony as part of her finding
of non-disability” and that Kidd's specific
“contentions are misplaced.” DE #18, at 3-4. The
Court, after reviewing the ALJ's Step 5 treatment,
considers each sub-argument in turn.
Judge
Kittinger's Step 5 analysis spans three pages. R. at
20-22. “To determine the extent to which”
Kidd's nonexertional limitations “erode[d] the
occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels,
” the ALJ asked VE Goss “whether jobs exist in
the national economy for an individual with [Kidd]'s age,
education, work experience, and [RFC].” R. at 21. Goss
“testified that given all of these factors [Kidd] would
be able to perform the requirements of representative
occupations such as” (1) sorter / packer (DOT
529.686-034), (2) cleaner (DOT 323.687-010), and (3) assembly
/ bench worker (DOT 737.687-074). Id. ALJ Kittinger
“accept[ed] that testimony and f[ound] that it is
consistent with the information contained in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles.”
Id.
In her
written decision, the ALJ explicitly recognized Kidd's
comprehensive “object[ion] to the sufficiency of the
vocational testimony of Martha Goss, ” made in
differing ways “[d]uring the hearing and in a
post-hearing memorandum, ” in which he argued
“in part that the testimony was based on
unreliable information and that Ms. Goss lacked sufficient
experience and or [sic] expertise to offer the opinions she
provided.” R. at 21 (emphasis added) (citing Exhibit
21E, at pp. 1, 5, 6, and 8). Judge Kittinger also
acknowledged Kidd's request for “a supplemental
hearing to further assert the challenge to the vocational
evidence.” Id. ALJ Kittinger ultimately
“overruled” Kidd's “objection”
and “denied” the “request for a
supplemental hearing.” Id.
Judge
Kittinger proceeded to find Goss “to be qualified,
based on her training and experience, ” under
applicable “qualifications and standards, ” to
“testify in disability hearings.” Id.
(citing Exhibit 18E). Referencing the Code of Federal
Regulations and S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000),
the ALJ found “that the source material referred by Ms.
Goss and the evidence which she provided complies with such
guidelines and is accordingly reliable.” Id.
Finally, ALJ Kittinger, noting Kidd's intra- and
post-hearing objection, held that Kidd received a hearing
compliant with due process requirements. Id. In
summary, “[b]ased on the testimony of the vocational
expert, ” and considering Kidd's “age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,
” the ALJ found Kidd “capable of making a
successful adjustment to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.” R. at 22.
Against
this treatment, Kidd[5] first charges that the ALJ failed
“to address evidence related to the social functioning
requirement in the jobs named by the” VE. DE #16, at
4-7; see also Id. at 6 (“[T]he ALJ failed to
even acknowledge this evidence.”); id. at 7
(arguing that a supplementary report went “wholly
unaddressed by the ALJ's decision”). In fact,
however, the ALJ specifically cited the two pages of the
post-hearing memorandum that Kidd baselessly argues she did
not. See R. at 21 (ALJ citing Exhibit 21E, at 5, 6,
which corresponds to R. at 321-22, which Kidd cites at DE
#16, at 5). Later, the ALJ explicitly referenced Kidd's
“[p]ost-hearing brief, ” which “fully set
forth his objections, ” and indicated consideration of
the entirety. See R. at 21 (citing “Exhibit
21E, pp. 1-46”). Judge Kittinger, thus, did
consider this argument and evidence (including the
supplementary report)-she rejected it, but she undoubtedly
addressed it. Kidd understandably desires a different
outcome, but his procedural argument of simple
non-consideration is plainly wrong.
Kidd's
real request, it seems, is for the Court “to hold that
the ALJ erred when she did not consult the vocational expert
[i.e., Goss] with respect to” the competing
Santagati report. DE #16, at 7. Paula Santagati, per
Claimant, is “a Senior Vocational Rehabilitation
Counsel for the Massachusetts Rehabilitation
Commission.” R. at 321. Santagati purports to offer her
own most generalized (and quite radical)[6] “vocational
opinion” that, as of October 2015, “a limitation
of occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors
precludes all work as the training and probationary period
for any job would require more than occasional interaction
with co-workers and supervisors.” R. at 360. Santagati
said utterly nothing specific about
Kidd's life, health, ability to work, or case.
Again,
Claimant does not challenge the RFC determination
(i.e., the basis for the ALJ's hypothetical to
Goss) of, as relevant here, Kidd's inability to have
“more than occasional interaction with supervisors and
coworkers[.]” See R. at 17. Kidd simply claims
that the ALJ was required to examine the testifying VE about
another “vocational opinion.” See DE
#16, at 4-5 (characterizing Santagati's report as
providing “rebuttal vocational evidence”).
Claimant cites no authority requiring such a VE inquiry, and
the Court has independently found none. Goss stated her
own impartial, professional opinion, regarding
Kidd's individual case. Claimant could have extensively
cross-examined her on the topics he now raises, but he did
not.[7] [The Santagati report existed at the
time of the hearing.] The ALJ had no duty to convene a second
hearing to pepper the VE with questions that Kidd could have
raised initially. See Lindsley v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting claim
that an ALJ “did not interrogate VE Breslin with
sufficient rigor”: “Lindsley was afforded a full
opportunity to cross-examine Breslin. The ALJ had no duty
under S.S.R. 00-4p to interrogate him further.”);
Ferguson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269,
275 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ has discretion to
determine whether additional ...