United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
DORIS CAMPAGNA, Executrix of the Estate of Franklin Grimes, Plaintiff,
GGNSC LOUISVILLE HILLCREEK, LLC, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. Hale, Judge
Campagna sued Defendant GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek, LLC, on
behalf of her father Franklin Grimes, who was a resident of
Golden Living Center - Hillcreek, a skilled nursing facility
operated by GGNSC. (See D.N. 1-1) Campagna alleges that GGNSC
violated Grimes's rights as a nursing-home resident under
Kentucky law and negligently injured him, ultimately
resulting in his wrongful death. (Id.)
removed the action to this Court and seeks to compel
arbitration of Campagna's claims. (D.N. 1; D.N. 5) For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part
GGNSC's motion to compel arbitration, excluding
Campagna's wrongful-death claim.
Grimes was first admitted to Hillcreek on January 11, 2010,
and stayed until his discharge on November 8, 2010. (D.N.
14-2; D.N. 16-1) Beginning in February 2013, Grimes was
readmitted and discharged on a No. of occasions, staying at
Hillcreek from February 19, 2013 to March 8, 2013 (D.N.
14-3), March 21, 2013 to March 23, 2013 (D.N. 14-4), and
March 25, 2013 until his death on June 11, 2015 (D.N. 14-5;
D.N. 14-14). During his final stay at Hillcreek, Grimes left
the facility for periodic admissions to the local Veterans
Affairs Hospital. (See D.N. 46-1; D.N. 46-2)
contends that as part of the admissions process, Grimes
entered into three separate arbitration agreements: January
11, 2010 (D.N. 16-1); February 19, 2013 (D.N. 5-1, PageID #
31-34); and March 26, 2013 (id., PageID # 35-38). The 2013
Agreements each require the parties to arbitrate
all claims in law or equity arising from one Party's
failure to satisfy a financial obligation to the other Party;
a violation of a right claimed to exist under federal, state,
or local law or contractual agreement between the Parties;
tort; breach of contract; consumer protection; fraud;
misrepresentation; negligence; gross negligence; malpractice;
and any alleged departure from any applicable federal, state,
or local medical, health care, consumer, or safety standards.
(Id., PageID # 32, 36) The 2010 Agreement contains
similar language. (D.N. 16-1, PageID # 152) The Agreements
also contain a remain-in-effect clause, which states that the
Agreements' provisions would remain in effect for all
subsequent stays at Hillcreek, even if Grimes was discharged
from and readmitted to the facility. (D.N. 5-1, PageID # 33,
37; D.N. 16-1, PageID # 153) Additionally, GGNSC maintains
that Grimes entered into two admissions contracts pertaining
to his February 19, 2013 and March 25, 2013 admissions to
Hillcreek. Each contract states:
This [Admissions] Agreement supersedes any prior admission
contracts regarding your admission to our LivingCenter.
However, if you execute, or have executed, an Alternative
Dispute Resolution Agreement with us in connection with any
admission to our LivingCenters, then that Agreement shall be,
and remain, binding upon you, and upon us, in accordance with
the terms that are set forth in that Agreement.
(D.N. 42-2, PageID # 430, 440)
action, Plaintiff Doris Campagna asserts various claims of
negligence against GGNSC on Grimes's behalf. (See D.N.
1-1) According to the complaint, GGNSC failed to discharge
its obligations to Grimes, and in so failing, caused Grimes
to suffer injuries, which resulted in his wrongful death.
(See id.) GGNSC moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the
alleged arbitration agreements between Grimes and GGNSC.
(D.N. 1; D.N. 5) Campagna sought limited discovery on the
issues raised in her response brief to GGNSC's motion to
compel arbitration. (D.N. 15) Specifically, Campagna
questioned the validity of the Agreements based on the order
in which they may have been presented to Grimes. (See D.N.
14) In a memorandum opinion and order entered August 14,
2017, Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay granted
Campagna's request for limited discovery. (D.N. 27)
Following completion of the limited discovery, the parties
filed supplemental briefs on the issue. (D.N. 37; D.N. 38) On
March 20, 2018, the Court ordered the parties to complete
further supplemental briefing on three outstanding issues.
(D.N. 39) After submission of the briefs, this matter is ripe
for review. (See D.N. 40; D.N. 42; D.N. 43; D.N. 44)
initial matter, arbitration of Campagna's wrongful-death
claim may not be compelled. See Richmond Health
Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 2016); see
also Brandenburg Health Facilities, LP v. Mattingly,
No. 3:15-cv-833-DJH, 2016 WL 3448733, at *6 (W.D. Ky. June
20, 2016). And GGNSC concedes that Campagna's
wrongful-death claim is not arbitrable. (D.N. 42-1, PageID #
412-13) Accordingly, the Court will not compel arbitration of
the wrongful-death claim. Campagna may pursue that claim in
Motion to Compel Arbitration
The Federal Arbitration Act states that
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition any United States district court . .
. for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement . . . . The court shall
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court ...