United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BOOM, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
a pro se civil rights action brought by a pretrial
detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff Treyshawn Lee Jones leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claim
against Defendant Correct Care Solutions (CCS) but allow
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
brings this action against Defendant CCS, the healthcare
provider at Louisville Metro Department of Corrections where
Plaintiff is incarcerated.
alleges that he chipped his tooth on November 25, 2017, and
that after he filed multiple healthcare request forms with
CCS, he was prescribed ibuprofen for pain. Plaintiff then
states that on April 7, 2018:
CCS seen me for an appointment for their dentist to perform
surgery. He drilled, cut, and pulled to extract my tooth. He
also broke the crown of my tooth. He failed, leaving me in
pain and half my tooth still in my mouth. He then prescribed
me medication, Tylenol #3 and Amoxicillin 500 mg and
scheduled an offsite dentist appointment. . . .
then alleges that on April 12, 2018, “CCS provided
another dentist. He tried to extract the rest of my tooth but
the numbing medication he injected in my gum didn't work.
He stopped leaving me again in pain and half my tooth still
in my mouth.”
concludes his complaint by stating that as of May 7, 2018, he
is “still waiting for the offsite appointment.”
seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).