Haws v. Berryhill

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          H. Brent Brcnncnstuhl United States Magistrate Judge

         BACKGROUND

         Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Robert Haws (“Plaintiff”) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the Plaintiff (DN 15) and Defendant (DN 18) have filed a Fact and Law Summary. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment (DN 15) and Defendant has filed a response (DN 18). For the reasons that follow, the final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

         Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties have consented to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case, including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 11). By Order entered December 1, 2017 (DN 12), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written request therefor was filed and granted. No. such request was filed.

         FINDINGS OF FACT

         Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on June 27, 2014^[1] (Tr. 10, 195). Plaintiff alleged that he became disabled on April 16, 2013, as a result of a back injury and degenerative disc disease (Tr. 10, 226). On April 19, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Marci P. Eaton (“ALJ”) conducted a video hearing from Paducah, Kentucky (Tr. 10, 80-82). Plaintiff and his attorney, Sara Martin, participated from Owensboro, Kentucky^[2] (Id.). Also present in Paducah and testifying was Kenneth Boaz, an impartial vocational expert.

         In a decision dated June 10, 2016, the ALJ evaluated this adult disability claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr. 10-20). At the first step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 16, 2013, the alleged onset date (Tr. 12). At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following “severe” impairment: degenerative disc disease status post lumbar surgeries with residual pain (Id.). At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Id.).

         At the fourth step, the ALJ made the following finding:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he can frequently climb ramps and stairs, and occasionally climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. He can frequently stoop, crouch, and crawl. He should avoid concentrated exposure to vibrating equipment, moving machinery and unprotected heights.

         Relying on testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing his past relevant work as a casting and forging machine operator (Tr. 18-19). Nonetheless, the ALJ made alternative findings for step five of the sequential evaluation process.

         At the fifth step, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience as well as testimony from the vocational expert (Tr. 19-20). The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing a significant No. of jobs that exist in the national economy (Tr. 20). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a “disability,” as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 16, 2013 through June 10, 2016, the date of the decision (Id.). PLAINTIFF timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision (Tr. 193-94). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-4).

         CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

         Standard of Review

Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are supported by “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.” Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for substantial evidence, the Court Amay not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).

         As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-4). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of the Commissioner’s decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not the Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).

         The Commissioner’s Sequential Evaluation Process The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II Disability Insurance Benefits), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI Supplemental Security Income). The term Adisability" is defined as an

[Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).

         The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See “Evaluation of disability in general,” 20 C.F.R. §§ ...