United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky
H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge
a pro se civil rights action brought by an inmate
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted
Plaintiff Henry Pete Allison III leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
set forth below, this action will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated at Muhlenberg County Detention Center (MCDC).
He brings this action against MCDC and Seth Blakeley, the
Deputy Jailer at MCDC.
complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows: “I was strip
searched on video camera in someone else's isolation cell
by Deputy Jailer Seth Blakeley on 1/4/18 around 1:30-2:30 AM.
There is a designated strip search room with no camera. That
was not used for myself but was used for others.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks “justice for the violation of
my privacy and the humiliation that was caused.”
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim
will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
based upon an illegal strip search are usually analyzed under
the Fourth and/or Eighth Amendments. Here, however,
Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Hubbert v. Myers, No.
92-1232, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21883 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 1993)
(affirming summary judgment against a plaintiff who alleged
that the defendants “conducted a strip search which was
taped by a video camera operated by a female employee”
in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments); Gaines v. City of N.Y., No. 15-CV-2630
(RRM) (RER), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136951, at *8-14 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 2016) (finding no Fourth nor Eighth Amendment claim
where the plaintiff alleged he had been strip searched in
front of a video camera and other inmates with female staff
present); Sanchez v. Bauer, No. 14-cv-02804-MSK-KLM,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113190, at *15-16 (D.C. Colo. Aug. 26,
2015) (finding allegation that the plaintiff was “video
recorded” while he was strip searched failed to state a
Fourth Amendment claim); Smith v. City of N.Y., No.
14-CV-5934 (JCF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81337, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2015) (recognizing that “neither the
presence of cameras nor the presence of other inmates and
employees of a correctional facility makes an otherwise
constitutional strip search unconstitutional”);
Peek v. City of N.Y., No. 13-CV-4488 (AJN), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117516, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014)
(dismissing a Fourth Amendment claim based on a strip search
in front of a camera because “[w]ithout more . . . the
presence of a camera at a strip search does not amount to a
light of this jurisprudence, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
allegation that he was “strip searched on video
camera” fails to ...