United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. Hood, Senior U.S. District Judge.
matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [DE 11]. The
plaintiffs responded [DE 13] and the motion is ripe for
ruling. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be
proceeding pro se, filed the Complaint in this matter against
National Cooperative Bank for violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 and Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Plaintiffs obtained a
loan from Defendant in 2000. The loan related to property or
an interest in a co-op (it is not clear from the record at
this stage), which Defendant says is located in Michigan and
Plaintiff claims is an intangible interest not located in any
state. Plaintiffs allege Defendant misapplied payments on
their loan and made inaccurate reports to the credit
reporting agencies that negatively affected their credit
scores. Plaintiffs moved from Michigan to Kentucky in 2006.
filed an Answer to the Complaint, but soon thereafter moved
to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiffs did not aver any
facts relating to personal jurisdiction in the Complaint
other than that Defendant's principal place of business
is in Hillsboro, Ohio, a fact that Defendant admits as true.
Standard of Review
“need only make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). To meet this burden, they
must establish “with reasonable particularity
sufficient contacts between [Defendants] and the forum state
to support jurisdiction.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen
Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). In reviewing a defendant's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), this Court relies on the
pleadings and affidavits of the parties and construes the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties.
See Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). “[T]the plaintiff
must make only a prima facie showing that personal
jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal . . . the
pleadings and affidavits submitted must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and the district court
should not weigh the controverting assertions of the party
seeking dismissal. Air Prod. & Controls, Inc. v.
Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case
stems from the existence of a federal question, personal
jurisdiction over a defendant exists ‘if the defendant
is amenable to service of process under the [forum]
state's long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would not deny the defendant[ ] due
process.'” Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865,
871 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Michigan Coalition of
Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954
F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir.1992). Where, as here, the defendant
objects to personal jurisdiction, this Court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if such
jurisdiction is (1) authorized by Kentucky law and (2)
otherwise consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Youn v. Track, Inc., 324
F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2003) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1).
Kentucky's long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:
(2) (a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim
arising from the person's:
1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 2.
Contracting to supply services or goods in this Commonwealth;
. . . .
KRS § 454.210(2)(a). Kentucky courts construe the
state's long-arm statute as coextensive with the limits
of due process. Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589, 592
(Ky. 2002). The Court may exercise jurisdiction over
Defendants if personal jurisdiction is consistent with the
requirements of federal due process.
jurisdiction exists where the claims in the case arise from
or are related to the defendant's contacts with the forum
state. Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc.,
106 F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1997).
Court addresses three criteria to determine if an exercise of
specific jurisdiction is proper. First, Defendants must have
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in
Kentucky or purposefully caused a consequence in the state.
Next, the cause of action must arise from Defendants'
actions in Kentucky. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable. See Aristech Chem. Int'l Ltd. v.
Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 628 ...