United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Henry
R. Wilhoit Jr. United State District Judge.
Eric
Anthony Johnson is an inmate confined at the Boyd County
Detention Center ("BCDC") in Catlettsburg,
Kentucky. Johnson has filed a. pro se civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [D. E. No. 1]
The Court has granted Johnson pauper status by prior
Order.
The
Court must conduct a preliminary review of Johnson's
complaint because he has been granted permission to pay the
filing fee in installments and because he asserts claims
against government officials. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2), 1915A. A district court must dismiss any claim
that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). When
testing the sufficiency of Johnson's complaint, the Court
affords it a forgiving construction, accepting as true all
non-conclusory factual allegations and liberally construing
its legal claims in the plaintiffs favor. Davis v. Prison
Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2012).
Johnson
alleges that in June 2015, two bail bondsman attempted to
apprehend him at a home in Ashland, Kentucky. He hit one of
them with a glass ashtray (in self-defense, he contends)
before fleeing the house. [D. E. No. 1 at 2] Johnson states
that in October 2018 - October 2017, the Court assumes - he
was arrested in Ohio for driving on a suspended license. Two
weeks later he was extradited to Boyd County, Kentucky
pursuant to a Kentucky warrant on a charge of second degree
assault, apparently arising out of his altercation with the
bail bondsmen. Id. at 2.
Johnson
alleges that Ashland police officer C. Serrano included
materially false statements and omissions in the June 2015
warrant request because the bail bondsmen acted illegally and
he acted in self-defense. [D. E. No. 1 at 2-3] He further
alleges that Commonwealth Attorney Rhonda Copley acted
improperly for the same reasons when she obtained an
indictment against him on this charge. Finally, Johnson
alleges that the bail bondsmen admitted to Sergeant T. Renfro
that they intended to take him across state lines to face a
misdemeanor charge. Id. at 3-4. Johnson contends
that the defendants' actions constituted false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, and seeks
damages against each of the defendants. [D. E. No. 1 at 1, 4]
The
Court has thoroughly reviewed the complaint, but concludes
that it must be dismissed, without prejudice to Johnson's
right to file a new case at the appropriate time. This is so
because the criminal charges about which Johnson complains
are still pending against him in the Circuit Court of Boyd
County, Kentucky, with a pretrial conference set in that case
on March 23, 2018. Commonwealth v. Johnson, No.
18-CR-0004 (Boyd. Cir. Ct. 2018).[1] Where
... a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been
convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that
will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal
trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in
accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until
the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is
ended. ... If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if
the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, [Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] will require
dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent
some other bar to suit.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007); see also
Quakenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730
(1996). Similarly, dismissal of the criminal charges is a
prerequisite to a malicious prosecution claim, which requires
the plaintiff to establish the favorable termination of the
prosecution against him. Johnson v. Moseley, 790
F.3d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2015). Therefore, at a minimum,
Johnson's claims regarding his prosecution would have to
be stayed pending the outcome of his state court criminal
proceedings.
But
where, as here, Johnson's claims directly challenge the
viability of the criminal prosecution against him, abstention
is warranted. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not
exercise jurisdiction over civil matters in any fashion that
would interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions
absent truly extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 44.
The rule is "designed to permit state courts to try
state cases free from interference by federal courts,
particularly where the party to the federal case may fully
litigate his claim before the state court." Zalman
v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986). To
determine whether Younger abstention is required, a
court considers whether (1) a state proceeding is pending at
the time the federal action is initiated; (2) an adequate
opportunity is provided to raise the constitutional claims in
state court; and (3) there are extraordinary circumstances
that nevertheless warrant federal intervention. Id.
The
criminal charges against Johnson remain pending, and he has
not suggested that the state court would not give full and
fair consideration to his constitutional claims as part of a
defense to the charges against him. Due respect for the legal
process in state courts precludes any presumption that state
courts are unable or unwilling to safeguard federal
constitutional rights. Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc, 457 U.S. 423, 431
(1982). Nothing in the complaint indicates the presence of
any factor which "render[s] the state court incapable of
fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before
it" as required to satisfy the "extraordinary
circumstances" exception. See Kugler v.
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Younger
abstention is therefore warranted and appropriate with
respect to Johnson's allegations regarding alleged
constitutional infirmities in his prosecution. Tindall v.
Wayne County Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538 (6th
Cir. 2001) (Younger abstention counsels federal
court to refrain from adjudicating matter otherwise properly
before it in deference to ongoing state criminal
proceedings).
Having
dismissed all of the federal claims over which this Court
possesses original subject matter jurisdiction upon initial
screening, the Court will dismiss the pendent state law claim
for abuse of process without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.
Johnson's complaint [D. E. No. 1] is
DIS ...