United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. MCKINLEY, JR., CHIEF JUDGE.
a pro se civil rights action brought by a convicted
prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff Andrew Christopher Knight leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court
for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss several
claims, but allow one claim to proceed for further
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
was incarcerated at Grayson County Detention Center (GCDC)
before he was transferred to Daviess County Detention Center
(DCDC). He brings this action against the following five
Defendants - Jason Woosley, GCDC Jailer, in his official
capacity only; Roy Washington, GCDC “Nurse
Practitioner/Acting Physician, ” in both his official
and individual capacities; “Nurse 1, ” in his
official capacity only; “Nurse 2, ” in her
official capacity only; and “C.O. Embry, ” GCDC
Guard, in his official capacity only.
complaint, Plaintiff states that on February 8, 2018, he
requested to see medical staff at GCDC concerning his mental
health medication. He states that he then received a response
in writing indicating that Defendant Washington had
prescribed him a mental health medication based upon
Plaintiff's records from the facility where he had
previously been incarcerated. Plaintiff states that Defendant
Washington ordered this medication for him without examining
him and that the medication caused “uncontrollable
physical side effects.” He then writes that he refused
this medication and “requested to be seen.”
Plaintiff then alleges that on February 13, 2018, he was
informed in writing that this was the only medication that
would be ordered for him based upon his medical records.
Plaintiff states that he then requested that the medication
be discontinued. Plaintiff alleges that he requested to see a
“mental health professional/ psychiatrist” on
February 21, 2018, but was instead seen by Defendant
“Nurse 1.” Plaintiff states that he told
“Nurse 1” that he needed to see a psychiatrist to
be evaluated and that “Nurse 1” told him that he
would speak with Defendant Washington about this request.
Plaintiff states that he filed another request “to
medical the following day, ” and that on February 23,
2018, he was seen by Defendant “Nurse 2.”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Nurse 2” told
him that Defendant Washington had stated that he would not
see or treat Plaintiff and that he would not refer Plaintiff
to a mental health professional. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant “Nurse 2” told him this in front of
states that on February 25, 2018, he “placed another
request for relief concerning past back surgeries, ”
but that he received a response from medical telling him that
he could purchase medication from the commissary.
states that on February 27, 2018, he was transferred to DCDC
“without response from any grievance or requests I
placed.” Plaintiff claims that he was transferred
“to keep from being treated medically” at GCDC
and so that he would be unable complete the § 1983
paperwork he had requested so that he could file this action.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as
well as injunctive relief “in the form of on-site
mental health professional staffed; group and mental health
counseling when requested; on site psychiatrist included;
separate housing for mental health patients when
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 ...