United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
MICHAEL A. PAPINEAU PLAINTIFF
SGT. CONWAY et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. McKinley, Jr., Chiei Judge United States District Court.
a pro se civil rights action brought by an inmate
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted
Plaintiff Michael A. Papineau leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will dismiss certain claims, but give
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
was previously incarcerated in the Webster County Jail (WCJ).
He brings this action against the WCJ and the following WCJ
officials in both their official and individual capacities -
Jailer Terry Elders, Sergeant Conway, and “C.O.
complaint, Plaintiff states as follows:
I was arrested 1/18/17. DUI. I awoke at Deaconess Hospital on
1/20/18. Went home, arrested for P.V. I am missing
three to seven days. At first, I was told I fell. I
didn't see how with injuries I had. I had two separate
head injuries. One a little higher than the other. One was
just a bruise about the thickness of my finger about four
inches long, the second swelled the whole side of my head and
took eight staples to close the wound. I have since found out
that a guard caused these injuries. When the guard came to
the holding cell he thought I was dead the way my head and
neck was twisted and all the blood in the floor. I had a
feeling what took place. I was handled badly by a guard. I
want someone to investigate. I still have headaches it took
two and a half months for my head to stop leaking. It was
shift change. All the guards were here and two inmates
witnessed it too. The nurse even told me while the doctor was
removing the staples that she attempted to stop the bleeding
that there was nothing in the cell that I could have fell in
to do the damage that I received. I have been told by a
witness that the guard, grabbed me with one hand and swept my
feet out from under me and drove my head into the toilet.
That's after he forced my head into wall in booking. They
said you could hear the toilet ring through out the jail.
separate portion of the complaint, Plaintiff states that he
was “viciously attacked by C.O.'s while
intoxicated.” In another section he states:
“During Booking, I was assaulted by the C.O.'s sent
to [illegible]. Recovered 8 staples, then transported to
[illegible] . . . Hospital before I came to.” As
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 ...