United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
J. Hale, United States District Judge.
Jamahll Todd filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Docket No.
1). On preliminary consideration under Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, the Court directed Petitioner to show cause within 30
days why his petition should not be dismissed as untimely.
More than 30 days have passed, and Petitioner has not filed a
conviction became final, for purposes of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), on March 18,
2013,  30 days after the trial court entered
judgment and the last date that he could have filed an appeal
under Rule 12.04(3) of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure. According to the petition, Petitioner did not file
any collateral attacks of his state court conviction until
February 12, 2014, which is 331 days after his conviction
became final. Thus, at that time, only 34 days remained in
the one-year period.
Petitioner's state-court post-conviction motion was
filed, the AEDPA one-year limitations period was tolled.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Payton v.
Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). The Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial on
January 13, 2017. At that point, the AEDPA's one-year
limitations began to run again, and thus the one-year period
expired on February 16, 2017, 34 days later. Petitioner did
not file the instant § 2254 petition in this Court until
September 12, 2017, 208 days after the one-year period
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) is not
jurisdictional, and it is subject to equitable tolling.
Sherwood v. Prelesnik, 579 F.3d 581, 587-88 (6th
Cir. 2009). “To be entitled to equitable tolling,
[Petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely
filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327,
336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2005)).
portion of the petition form asking for an explanation why
the one-year statute of limitations does not bar the petition
if the judgment of conviction became final more than one year
ago, Petitioner states that his trial attorney failed to tell
him of the one-year statute of limitations. He states that if
he had been made aware of the one-year limitations period he
would have filed his RCr 11.42 motion within six months after
final judgment. However, even assuming that Petitioner was
not made aware of the one-year limitations period,
“‘ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to
warrant equitable tolling.'” Allen v.
Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 403 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Consequently, Petitioner has offered no reason why his §
2254 petition should be considered timely. Accordingly, for
the reasons stated herein and in this Court's prior Order
(DN 10), the Court finds that the Petitioner's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
must be denied as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
individual, who unsuccessfully petitions for writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court and subsequently seeks
appellate review, must secure a certificate of appealability
(COA) from either “a circuit justice or judge”
before the appellate court may review the appeal. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1). A COA may not issue unless “the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
district court denies such a motion on procedural grounds
without addressing the merits of the petition, a COA should
issue if the petitioner shows “that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
plain procedural bar is present and a court is correct to
invoke it to dispose of the matter, a reasonable jurist could
not conclude either that the court erred in dismissing the
petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further. Id. In such a case, no appeal is warranted.
Id. The Court is satisfied that no jurist of reason
could find its procedural ruling to be debatable. Thus, no
certificate of appealability is warranted in this case.
Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum
 The time for filing an appeal actually
expired on March 16, 2013. However since that date was a
Saturday, the time ran until the following Monday, March 18,
2013. Ky. R. ...