United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court.
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (DN 7). For the reasons set forth below, the motion
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Nadir Mulaosmanovic (“Plaintiff”) brought this
action against Warren County, Jackie Strode
(“Strode”), and Stephen Harmon
“Defendants”), asserting that Defendants violated
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kentucky law. (Compl. ¶¶
13-23, DN 1). At all times relevant to this litigation,
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Warren County Regional Jail
(“WCRJ”), and Strode and Harmon worked as jailers
at that facility. (Compl. ¶ 2, 5, 7-8).
not altogether clear, the foundation of the Complaint appears
to be that Defendants failed to hire and train qualified
persons to work at the WCRJ, as evidenced by the fact that
the facility's medical personnel provided Plaintiff with
subpar treatment on October 12, 2016. (Compl. ¶ 6).
Plaintiff claims that another inmate assaulted him on that
date, and that the jailers at the WCRJ “failed to stop
the assault, ” causing him to suffer serious injuries
to the “left side of his face.” (Compl.
¶¶ 9-10). Plaintiff avers that the WCRJ's
unqualified medical staff then failed to treat his injuries
and refused to permit him to undergo an x-ray at an outside
facility. (Compl. ¶ 12). As evidence of the medical
staff's deficient treatment, Plaintiff notes that the
Warren District Court permitted him to visit an emergency
room on October 14, 2016. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14). X-rays
taken during that visit confirmed that Plaintiff had
“fractures on [the] left side of his face, ” for
which he underwent surgery. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14, 16).
PLAINTIFF filed this action on October 13, 2017, asserting
four claims against Defendants and one claim against an
unnamed defendant. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13-23). Strode
and Harmon are sued in both their official and individual
capacities. (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff claims that
Defendants failed to hire qualified employees and train their
employees, which constitute: (1) a violation of Section 1983
because the alleged misconduct infringes the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment;
(2) negligence and gross negligence; and (3) the tort of outrage.
(Compl. ¶¶ 13-21). Plaintiff also charges that
Defendants are liable for negligence per se, as aspects of
the WCRJ's medical department do not comply with 501 KAR
3:090. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23). Finally, Plaintiff
asserts a medical malpractice claim against an unnamed nurse
at WRCJ. (Compl. ¶ 17).
have moved to dismiss all claims. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss 1-12, DN 7-1 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot. Dismiss]).
Defendants assert that the statute of limitations bars all of
Plaintiff's claims except his claim of outrage.
(Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 2-5). They also state as grounds for
dismissal that: (1) Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim fails
to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and (2)
sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's state law claims
against Warren County, as well as the official-capacity state
law claims against Strode and Harmon. (Defs.' Mot Dismiss
6-12). The parties have briefed the issues attendant to
Defendants' motion, and it is ripe for adjudication.
action arises under the laws of the United States, and this
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1367.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
” and is subject to dismissal if it “fail[s] to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Traverse Bay Area
Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., 615
F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A claim is implausible if
an affirmative defense bars it. Southfield Educ.
Ass'n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., 570 Fed.Appx. 485,
487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
561-64); Conner v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 6
F.Supp.3d 717, 722 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“[A] complaint that
shows on its face that relief is barred by the affirmative
defense of the statute of limitations is properly subject to
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . .” (citation
argue that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity bar all of Plaintiff's claims.
(Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 2-8). The Court will address each
Statute of Limitations
limitations period for Section 1983 actions-as well as for
negligence, negligence per se, and medical malpractice
claims-is one-year based on Kentucky's personal injury
statute of limitations. Collard v. Ky. Bd. of
Nursing,896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted); Vannoy v. Milum,171 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Ky.
2005) (noting that medical malpractice actions are subject to
a one-year limitations period); see also KRS 413.140(1)(a).
Federal law “determines when [a Section 1983] cause of
action” accrues, state law determines when a state law
cause of action accrues, and state tolling laws apply to both
inquiries. See Perreault v. Hostetler,884 F.2d 267,
270 (6th Cir. 1989). Under both Kentucky and federal law,
“the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff
knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis
of the claim.” See Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d
227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also
McCarty v. Gilchrist,646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir.