United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge United States District
Curtis Lovell Johnson Miles, a pretrial detainee incarcerated
in the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC),
filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This matter is before the Court on initial
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
that follow, the complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff also
filed a letter (DN 6) addressed to the undersigned, which the
Court construes as a motion to file a supplemental complaint
and, for the reasons herein, will deny.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Defendants in the instant action, Plaintiff names (1)
“Unknown Caseworker(s)” at “Lou. Probation
and Parole” in their individual and official
capacities; (2) Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD)
Officer Matthew Kennington in his individual and official
capacities; (3) Johnathan Hall, Manager at the Kentucky
Department of Corrections (KDOC) in his individual and
official capacities; and (4) LaDonna Thompson, former KDOC
Commissioner in her official capacity. Plaintiff's
allegations in the complaint are based primarily upon prior
criminal arrests and convictions. He also raises a claim
regarding his religion. As relief, Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages and an apology from
Claims Regarding Prior Criminal Arrests and
Plaintiff's claims based upon prior criminal arrests and
convictions, his allegations begin in 2004 when he states
that he was charged with burglary. Plaintiff claims that he
spent three months and twelve days in jail before this charge
was dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that he was then arrested
for the same crime in 2005 and spent six months and twenty
days in jail before the charge was again dismissed. Plaintiff
states that, in 2006, he was again arrested on the same
charge and then spent twenty-one months in jail before being
unlawfully convicted of the crime in October 2007 and
receiving a ten-year sentence. Plaintiff claims that
“[t]he Police” violated his constitutional rights
by continuing to arrest and charge him for a crime
“that was lawfully dismissed.” Plaintiff also
claims that the 21-month period that he spent in jail between
his final arrest and ultimate conviction violated his right
to a speedy trial. He further claims that his conviction was
unlawful because he had verbally retracted his guilty plea
and was not present in the courtroom at final sentencing.
next claims that “Lou. Probation and Parole
manipulated, modified, and sabotaged my original 10-year
sentence, ” which led to him receiving a longer
sentence than he should have received. He alleges that the
“Lou. Probation and Parole” changed his arrest
date and his parole eligibility date; used an unlawful
timeframe to calculate his 10-year sentence; and
“manipulated and modified” his timesheet
resulting in a four-year minimum outdate. Plaintiff also
alleges that the “Parole Board” violated his
rights in 2008 by giving him “a 2-year
deferrment” and by “reviewing” him two
months after his review date.
further alleges that he was charged with escape in 2009.
Plaintiff claims that the KDOC unlawfully charged him with
escape because he was “8-months past his . . .
outdate” when he was charged and KDOC had failed to
release him when he had satisfied his ten-year sentence.
Plaintiff claims that the KDOC further violated his rights by
using forged documents that showed that he had a
“P.F.O-1 sentence” and had been convicted of
“PFO” in the past; miscalculating his jail-credit
time; refusing to give Plaintiff all of his accrued credits
at the same time; withholding Plaintiff's meritorious
“good time”; and unlawfully holding Plaintiff in
custody past his minimum outdate. Plaintiff claims that as
result of these violations he received five more years for
escape and burglary.
next claims that when he tried to contact the news media
about his unlawful imprisonment, the KDOC sent him to
“a Class-D Jail when I had a 15-year sentence.”
Plaintiff alleges that the KDOC sent him to a Class-D Jail to
deny him access to a law library, to prevent him from
contacting news media, because it would be easier to control
his mail and phone calls, and as a form of punishment.
respect to the foregoing allegations regarding
Plaintiff's prior arrests and convictions, Plaintiff
filed an earlier action, Miles v. Kennington et al.,
Civil Action No. 3:17CV-P514-DJH, containing almost identical
allegations and suing three of the same Defendants--LMPD
Officer Kennington, KDOC Manager Hall, and Unknown Probation
and Parole Caseworkers in their individual and official
capacities. By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered
December 1, 2017, after the instant action was filed, that
Court dismissed those same claims on initial review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for the following reasons: (1) as
barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) as
barred by the Heck doctrine; (3) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted because Plaintiff failed to
make specific allegations against Defendant Officer
Kennington in his individual capacity and failed to allege
that any injury occurred as a result of a policy or custom by
Louisville Metro Government, the real party-in-interest with
respect to the official-capacity claims against Defendant
Officer Kennington; (4) for failure to state a claim against
Defendant Manager Hall because Plaintiff failed to make
specific allegations against Defendant Manager Hall in his
individual capacity and because a state employee sued in his
official capacity for damages is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity and is not considered a
“person” subject to suit under § 1983.
See DNs 9 & 10 in Civil Action No.
consideration, the Court will dismiss the claims raised in
the instant action regarding Plaintiff's prior arrests
and convictions for those same reasons that the ...