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Miles v. Unknown Caseworker(s)

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

March 7, 2018

CURTIS LOVELL JOHNSON MILES PLAINTIFF
v.
UNKNOWN CASEWORKER(S) et al. DEFENDANTS

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge United States District Court.

         Plaintiff Curtis Lovell Johnson Miles, a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff also filed a letter (DN 6) addressed to the undersigned, which the Court construes as a motion to file a supplemental complaint and, for the reasons herein, will deny.

         I.

         Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

         II.

         As Defendants in the instant action, Plaintiff names (1) “Unknown Caseworker(s)” at “Lou. Probation and Parole” in their individual and official capacities; (2) Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) Officer Matthew Kennington in his individual and official capacities; (3) Johnathan Hall, Manager at the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) in his individual and official capacities; and (4) LaDonna Thompson, former KDOC Commissioner in her official capacity. Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint are based primarily upon prior criminal arrests and convictions. He also raises a claim regarding his religion. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and an apology from Defendants.

         A. Claims Regarding Prior Criminal Arrests and Convictions

         As to Plaintiff's claims based upon prior criminal arrests and convictions, his allegations begin in 2004 when he states that he was charged with burglary. Plaintiff claims that he spent three months and twelve days in jail before this charge was dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that he was then arrested for the same crime in 2005 and spent six months and twenty days in jail before the charge was again dismissed. Plaintiff states that, in 2006, he was again arrested on the same charge and then spent twenty-one months in jail before being unlawfully convicted of the crime in October 2007 and receiving a ten-year sentence. Plaintiff claims that “[t]he Police” violated his constitutional rights by continuing to arrest and charge him for a crime “that was lawfully dismissed.” Plaintiff also claims that the 21-month period that he spent in jail between his final arrest and ultimate conviction violated his right to a speedy trial. He further claims that his conviction was unlawful because he had verbally retracted his guilty plea and was not present in the courtroom at final sentencing.

         Plaintiff next claims that “Lou. Probation and Parole manipulated, modified, and sabotaged my original 10-year sentence, ” which led to him receiving a longer sentence than he should have received. He alleges that the “Lou. Probation and Parole” changed his arrest date and his parole eligibility date; used an unlawful timeframe to calculate his 10-year sentence; and “manipulated and modified” his timesheet resulting in a four-year minimum outdate. Plaintiff also alleges that the “Parole Board” violated his rights in 2008 by giving him “a 2-year deferrment” and by “reviewing” him two months after his review date.

         Plaintiff further alleges that he was charged with escape in 2009. Plaintiff claims that the KDOC unlawfully charged him with escape because he was “8-months past his . . . outdate” when he was charged and KDOC had failed to release him when he had satisfied his ten-year sentence. Plaintiff claims that the KDOC further violated his rights by using forged documents that showed that he had a “P.F.O-1 sentence” and had been convicted of “PFO” in the past; miscalculating his jail-credit time; refusing to give Plaintiff all of his accrued credits at the same time; withholding Plaintiff's meritorious “good time”; and unlawfully holding Plaintiff in custody past his minimum outdate. Plaintiff claims that as result of these violations he received five more years for escape and burglary.

         Plaintiff next claims that when he tried to contact the news media about his unlawful imprisonment, the KDOC sent him to “a Class-D Jail when I had a 15-year sentence.” Plaintiff alleges that the KDOC sent him to a Class-D Jail to deny him access to a law library, to prevent him from contacting news media, because it would be easier to control his mail and phone calls, and as a form of punishment.

         With respect to the foregoing allegations regarding Plaintiff's prior arrests and convictions, Plaintiff filed an earlier action, Miles v. Kennington et al., Civil Action No. 3:17CV-P514-DJH, containing almost identical allegations and suing three of the same Defendants--LMPD Officer Kennington, KDOC Manager Hall, and Unknown Probation and Parole Caseworkers in their individual and official capacities.[1] By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered December 1, 2017, after the instant action was filed, that Court dismissed those same claims on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for the following reasons: (1) as barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) as barred by the Heck[2] doctrine; (3) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because Plaintiff failed to make specific allegations against Defendant Officer Kennington in his individual capacity and failed to allege that any injury occurred as a result of a policy or custom by Louisville Metro Government, the real party-in-interest with respect to the official-capacity claims against Defendant Officer Kennington; (4) for failure to state a claim against Defendant Manager Hall because Plaintiff failed to make specific allegations against Defendant Manager Hall in his individual capacity and because a state employee sued in his official capacity for damages is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and is not considered a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See DNs 9 & 10 in Civil Action No. 3:17CV-P514-DJH.

         Upon consideration, the Court will dismiss the claims raised in the instant action regarding Plaintiff's prior arrests and convictions for those same reasons that the ...


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