United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky
MONYAL D. SMITH PLAINTIFF
FULTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. Russell, Senior Judge
Monyal D. Smith filed the instant pro se complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court
upon initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Fulton County
Detention Center (FCDC). The Court will also direct Plaintiff
to clarify the allegations against two other Defendants.
identifying himself as a pretrial detainee, sues the FCDC, as
well as Acting Jailer Carrie Powell, Chief Deputy Jeff
Johnson, and Corrections Officers Brittany Walsh and William
Jackson in his or her individual capacity. Plaintiff states
that when he was booked into the FCDC on November 4, 2016, he
was assigned to “POD 121, ” a cell pod for county
inmates. However, shortly after entering the cell pod, state
inmate Davenport threatened him with a sharp utensil and told
him to leave the cell pod. Plaintiff asserts that he informed
non-Defendant corrections officer Jamie Alexander, who moved
Plaintiff to another cell pod and “put a keep away
on [Plaintiff] & Davenport like a conflict[.]”
Plaintiff states that eleven days later he was transferred to
another county facility and then subsequently released.
Plaintiff reports that on February 8, 2017, he re-entered
FCDC and was assigned to POD 121, the same cell pod where he
was threatened by Davenport. He states that ten minutes after
he entered the cell pod, inmate Davenport again made verbal
threats to him and the two began fighting. He states that the
cameras in the cell pod were not working. According to the
complaint, after twenty minutes of fighting, both inmates
retreated. However, Davenport then reached under his bunk and
“came towards [Plaintiff] with a sharp utensil the same
homemade knife” he had used to threaten Plaintiff
previously. Plaintiff maintains that Davenport chased him
around the cell pod with the knife and ultimately cut him in
his chest, left arm, and head.
states, “[T]he officer William Johnson (CO) came in,
ordered Davenport to get off me . . . & it took a while
so Davenport finally did & ordered me . . . to exit out
of POD 121 & from there CO William Johnson called
Brittany Walsh” and they told two non-Defendant
corrections officers to take Plaintiff to medical. Plaintiff
asserts that he later learned that Davenport was allowed to
return to the cell pod on February 10, 2017, but that
Plaintiff was held in medical isolation until February 14,
2017. Plaintiff was later put in another cell pod, “POD
105.” Plaintiff further states as follows:
[F]rom there F.C.D.C ..... acted as if it never happened.
They unproffessionally put me in a county POD 121 filled with
state inmates. Then after CO Jamie Alexander  who longer
works here, had put a  keep away  on [Plaintiff] and
Davenport till my life was in danger & no cameras & a
conflict which wasn't honored so there for im filling
this statement of claims against the Jail Association &
the staff I've included.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).