United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on numerous pre-trial motions
filed by Defendant Dexter Durrell Cooper. For the reasons
explained below, these motions are denied.
14, 2017, Cooper filed an unusually formatted motion
consisting of sixteen exhibits. (DE 40). Three of those
exhibits purport to be motions. Exhibit 1 is styled Notice of
Motion of Denial of Any and All Alleged Charges. (DE 40-1).
It contains no argument, asks the Court to take judicial
notice of irrelevant public laws, and seeks a claim for
relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b).
Because this is a criminal proceeding and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not apply this motion is denied.
Exhibit 2 is styled Notice of Motion of Constitutional
Challenge to All Federal Statues and alleges due process
violations. (DE 40-2). In this supposed motion, Cooper
restates verbatim Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5.1,
which is irrelevant to this criminal proceeding, claims his
charges are fraudulent, and lists a number of irrelevant
constitutional amendments. It is also denied. Exhibit 16 is
styled as a Notice of Motion and Motion to be Heard. (DE
40-12) and fails to state a basis for relief. The remaining
thirteen exhibits do not purport to be motions and therefore
the Court will not address them except to note that any
effort by Cooper to disclaim United States citizenship is
irrelevant to this Court's jurisdiction over him. See
Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir.
1944) (“The presence of appellant in the Kentucky
District Court gave it complete jurisdiction over his person,
regardless of how his presence was secured.”) (citing
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 10 (1927)).
September 27, 2017, Cooper filed an untitled motion, again
incorrectly invoking Rule 12(b) of the Civil Rules of
Procedure. (DE 56). Cooper's substantive argument is that
the arrest warrant (DE 2, DE 7) was not based on probable
cause supported by oath and affirmation and violated Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rules 3 and 4. These arguments
are meritless. Cooper's arrest warrant was based upon a
grand jury indictment charging him with possession with
intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine,
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a
firearm. (DE 1). An indictment “by a properly
constituted grand jury, conclusively determines existence of
probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to
answer.” Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241,
250 (1932). Thus, Cooper's arrest warrant was proper
under Rule 9 and did not need to be supported by a criminal
complaint. Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a) (“The court must issue
a warrant . . . for each defendant named in an indictment . .
October 2, 2017, Cooper filed another untitled motion, (DE
58), which, in large part, restated arguments from his motion
to suppress, (DE 24), and made objections to the Magistrate
Judge's Recommended Disposition, (DE 44). Those
objections have been considered de novo by this
Court and denied. (DE 107). This motion also contains
unsubstantiated allegations that Magistrate Judge Wier failed
to act impartially. Cooper also claims that he had a right to
notice of his grand jury hearing and that he should have been
given the right to present evidence to the grand jury. No.
such right exists. Fed. R. Cr. P. 6(d) (“The following
persons may be present while the grand jury is in session:
attorneys for the government, the witness being questioned,
interpreters when needed, and a court reporter or an operator
of a recording device.”). Thus, to the extent that
claims exist in this motion not addressed by the Court's
previous Order, (DE 107), this motion is denied.
on November 8, 2017, Cooper filed a Motion for Personal
Recognizance Bond. (DE 66). This motion restates his belief
that Criminal Rules 3 and 4 were violated. For the reasons
discussed above, this claim is meritless. Cooper's arrest
warrant was properly issued based on a grand jury indictment
pursuant to Rule 9. Cooper also appears to argue that the
Magistrate Judge who issued his arrest warrant, was not
neutral or detached. He provides no support for this
allegation and the claim is particularly irrelevant where, as
here, the arrest warrant was based on a grand jury indictment
under Rule 9, not a sworn complaint by an officer under Rule
his competency hearing, Cooper sought to make an oral motion
under Criminal Rule 12.4 and was instructed to file that
motion in writing. (DE 69). Cooper filed his Rule 12.4
Disclosure Statement Motion Violation on November 21, 2017.
(DE 71). This motion is irrelevant to these proceedings. Rule
12.4 requires a “nongovernmental corporate party”
to “file a statement identifying any parent
corporation, ” Fed. R. Cr. P. 12.4(a)(1) and the
government to file a statement identifying “if an
organization is a victim of the alleged criminal activity,
” Fed. R. Cr. P. 12.4(a)(2). The parties to this case
are the United States and Dexter Cooper, neither of which is
a nongovernmental corporate party. The United States has
stated that there are no organizational victims in this case.
November 22, 2017, Cooper filed a Motion for Complaint of the
United States Chief Judge Failure of Allowing Attorney for
the Government to Bypass Strictly Compliance of Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedures Rule 3. (DE 72). This motion also
claims violations of Rules 4 and 5 based on the lack of a
criminal complaint. As explained above, Cooper's arrest
warrant was based on a grand jury indictment and proper under
filed three Motions for Opportunity to be heard on November
27, 2017. In his first motion, (DE 75), Cooper reiterated
claims that he believes the Police Incident Report was
altered. This claim has been addressed and rejected in the
Court's Order adopting the Magistrate Judge's
Recommended Disposition. (DE 107). Cooper also continues to
make the bizarre challenge to the use of certain evidence in
his competency evaluation, despite his agreement with the
report's conclusion that he is competent. Because Cooper
stated during his competency hearing that he is not
challenging that determination, his disagreement with the
evaluators decision to rely on certain evidence is moot.
second motion to be heard concerns proceedings on state
charges. (DE 76). He claims that he was not afforded due
process when his state charges were dismissed. This argument
is irrelevant to this federal criminal proceeding. Cooper
also makes various arguments that the evidence does not show
he possessed cocaine. These arguments are better suited for
trial, not pre-trial motions.
third motion to be heard concerns the Court's statement
during Cooper's competency hearing that a number of his
letters were not clearly identified as motions. (DE 77). This
motion, which is difficult to decipher due to its invocation
of irrelevant legal standards such as Civil Rule 12(b) and
laches, is moot since the Court is addressing all pending
motions now that Cooper's competency hearing has been
completed and all stays have been lifted.
November 28, 2017, Cooper filed a motion to dismiss. (DE 78).
In this motion, Cooper again argues that Criminal Rule 3 was
violated. For the reasons discussed above it is denied.
motion to be heard was filed by Cooper on November 30, 2017.
(DE 81). This motion restates arguments made in his original
motion to suppress, and subsequent objections to the
Magistrate Judge's Recommended Disposition, that officers
lacked probable cause to impound and search his vehicle. For
the reasons discussed in the Court's order adopting the
Recommended Disposition, this motion is denied. (DE 107).
also filed a Criminal Complaint on November 30, 2017. (DE
82). While not a motion requiring adjudication, the Court
notes that this filing is wholly irrelevant to Cooper's
defense of the charges against him.
filed a motion to be heard and motion to dismiss on December
12, 2017. (DE 95). This motion, however, merely restates
arguments made in his earlier motion to suppress (DE 24) and
addressed by the Court in its previous order ...