Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Allison v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

February 20, 2018



          Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge United States District Court

         This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [DN 54]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Court holds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

         I. Background

         PLAINTIFF Henry P. Allison brings this lawsuit claiming that Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS”) has committed various violations of the Federal Debt Collections Practice Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq. In 2002, Plaintiff refinanced his home mortgage with Equifirst Corporation. In 2003, Plaintiff fell behind on loan payments. The mortgage loan has been the subject of two other court proceedings. First, on December 9, 2004, Plaintiff and his late wife filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in the Western District of Kentucky. The bankruptcy action was dismissed on December 26, 2007 on motion of the trustee. Thereafter, on January 10, 2008, the Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A. (“Bank of New York”) instituted a civil action against Plaintiff in Jefferson County Circuit Court, seeking to foreclose on the mortgage. It was during this foreclosure action that Plaintiff retained his current attorney. Plaintiff claims that the mortgage brokers who assisted him falsely represented his income, mislead Plaintiff as to the terms of the loan, and forged his signature on closing documents. The foreclosure action is still pending.

         On December 2, 2013, the servicing of Plaintiff's loan was transferred to Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS”). Despite the pending foreclosure action, SLS began sending Plaintiff letters seeking to collect money on behalf of the Bank of New York. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's attempts to collect on the debt violated the FDCPA and he filed this lawsuit. Defendant now brings this Motion for Summary Judgment, asking this Court to grant judgment in its favor on all claims against it.

         II. Standard of Review

         Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its motion and identifying that portion of the record that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

         Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

         III. Discussion

         Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Courts apply strict liability for violations of the FDCPA, “meaning that a consumer may recover statutory damages if the debt collector violates the FDCPA even if the consumer suffered no actual damages.” Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2009).

         Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes six claims against Defendants. Although Defendant has stated, “Counsel for Allison has stipulated that he will withdraw Count V, ” (Mot. to Dismiss [DN 54] at 2, n.1) the Court can find no such stipulation from Plaintiff in the record. Thus, summary judgment as to Count V is DENIED. Lastly, Count VI of the Amended Complaint asks the Court to award attorneys' fees to Plaintiff. However, since there is no underlying cause of action in Count VI, it is DISMISSED and Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees will be considered as part of his general prayer for relief.

         The Court will discuss each remaining claim in turn.

         A. Count I - False, Deceptive, or Misleading Representations

         Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading representations in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. This section of the FDCPA provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited practices in connection with collection of a debt. Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated this statute in the course of communications sent by Defendant to Plaintiff. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's letters included false representations of the amount of debt and fees that Plaintiff owed, which would fall under the prohibit practices of 1692e(2). Further, Plaintiff alleges that several letters and a door hanger ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.