United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. MCKINLEY JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Troy Lee Edmonds, an inmate incarcerated at the Daviess
County Detention Center (DCDC), filed this pro se
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
complaint is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds
by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will do the following: (1) dismiss
the claims raised in the complaint; (2) dismiss the DCDC; and
(3) allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint as to the
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
brings this action against the DCDC and seeks monetary
relief. According to Plaintiff, he has asked on multiple
occasions to be checked for prostate cancer. However,
Plaintiff states that his requests keep getting ignored.
Plaintiff states that “[t]hey aren't treating me
or/and other inmate fair By dening us medical attention
needed.” Plaintiff further states that he is housed in
a cell built to hold 22 men; however, the cell never has less
than 34 people in it, and Plaintiff has to sleep on the
floor. Further, Plaintiff states that “they won't
work [him], ” and he needs to be somewhere where he can
is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities,
officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the
instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). “However, while liberal, this standard of
review does require more than the bare assertion of legal
conclusions.” Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v.
Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The
court's duty “does not require [it] to conjure up
unpled allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a
plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Overcrowding and Sleeping on the Floor
claims that his rights have been violated because the cell in
which he is housed is overcrowded, and he must sleep on the
floor. “[O]vercrowding is not, in itself, a
constitutional violation.” Agramonte v.
Shartle, 491 F. App'x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012).
“‘[E]xtreme deprivations' must be alleged in
order to support a prison-overcrowding claim.”
Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 9 (1992)). If the overcrowding results in the denial of a
basic human need, such as food, shelter, or warmth, that
would be a constitutional wrong. Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). No. such circumstance has been
alleged here. Plaintiff does not state that he has not been
provided a mattress or mat to sleep on. His claim appears to
be that he must sleep on the floor rather than on an elevated
bed since there are not enough elevated beds for the number
of inmates housed in the cell. This allegation does not state
a claim of constitutional dimension because a prisoner has no
right to sleep on an elevated bed. See Sanders v.
Kingston, 53 F. App'x 781, 783 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“We know of no case holding that the Eighth Amendment
requires elevated beds for prisoners, and [plaintiff] does
not cite one.”); Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79,
85 (5th Cir. 1986) (The plaintiff “has cited no case
holding that the Constitution requires elevated beds for
prisoners, and we know of no source for such a
right.”); Graves v. Boyd, No. 5:16-CV-P51-TBR,
2016 WL 4386102, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2016) (recognizing
that “a prisoner has no constitutional right to sleep
on an elevated bed”).
is an additional reason that this claim must be dismissed.
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act [PLRA], 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act.” Plaintiff
has not alleged the commission of a sexual act. He has also
not alleged any physical injury in connection with being in
an overcrowded cell sleeping on the floor. Without the
showing of something more than a de minimis physical
injury associated with his claim, Plaintiff's claim
fails. See Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. App'x 394,
401 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding de minimis injury where
a prisoner complained that his legs were swollen, he suffered
pain while standing, and he had severe cramps in his thighs
when trying to sit); Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F.
App'x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that
plaintiff's claim that he was uncomfortable after being
sprayed with pepper spray was precluded by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e) since he failed to show more than a de
minimis injury); Adams v. Rockafellow, 66 F.
App'x 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant
since plaintiff failed to allege any physical injury arising
out of the strip searches about which he complained);
Robinson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. App'x 382,
383 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of claims for
“emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation, and
itching” since plaintiff “suffered at most only
de minimis physical injury”); Bey v. Garber,
No. 99-1471, 2000 WL 658721, at *1 (6th Cir. May 12, 2000)
(alleged humiliation and embarrassment suffered by inmate
seen naked and laughed at by female corrections officers
failed to satisfy physical-injury requirement); Pryor v.
Cox, No. 97-3912, 1999 WL 1253040, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec.
13, 1999) (finding plaintiff's claim of being subjected
to bad food, unsanitary conditions, and excessive heat
without also claiming he had suffered any physical injury as
a result of these conditions was meritless).
these reasons, this claim will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
states that “they won't work [him], ” and he
needs to be somewhere where he can work. A prisoner does not
have a constitutional right to a particular job, or to any
job at all. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348
(1981) (“[L]imited work hours . . . do not inflict
pain, much less unnecessary and wanton pain; deprivations of
this kind simply are not punishments.”); Newsom v.
Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
Constitution does not create a property or liberty interest
in prison employment . . . .”) (quotations omitted);
Ivey v. Wilson, 8 ...