Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Roof v. Bel Brands USA, Inc.

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division

January 11, 2018

KAREN ROOF PLAINTIFF
v.
BEL BRANDS USA, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge United States District Court.

         This matter is before the Court on a bill of costs submitted by Defendant Bel Brands USA requesting the Court to tax costs in the amount of $4, 747.45 against the Plaintiff Karen Roof [DN 71] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Plaintiff filed objections to Defendant's bill of costs and a request for a hearing [DN 77]. The Court finds that a hearing on the bill of costs is not necessary. Plaintiff also filed a motion for extension of time to file an appeal until after the disposition of all post-judgment motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A)(i) [DN 72]. Fully briefed, these matters are ripe for decision.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in state court on June 5, 2014, alleging employment discrimination, retaliation, and state law claims of promissory estoppel, negligent hiring, and civil conspiracy. Defendant removed the action to this Court. The Court denied Plaintiff's motion to remand and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss all the claims. Plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit who affirmed dismissal of all counts, except for her claim of sex discrimination for failure to promote. On remand, the parties took four depositions, and thereafter, Defendant moved for summary judgment. The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, entered judgment in favor of Defendant, and dismissed Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Defendant now moves for recovery of costs in the amount of $4, 747.45.

         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) “creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs, but allows denial of costs at the discretion of the trial court.” White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 786 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1986). See Ford v. FedEx Supply Chain Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1585849, *1 (W.D. Tenn. June 3, 2009) (AThere is “a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party in accordance with Rule 54(d).”). Therefore, “[t]he party objecting to the taxation bears the burden of persuading the Court that taxation is improper.” Roll v. Bowling Green Metal Forming, LLC., 2010 WL 3069106, *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2010) (citing BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Taniguchi v. Kan.Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012)). In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a district court may award costs only for those elements contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which provides:

         A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.

         III. DISCUSSION

         Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the bill of costs because: (A) Plaintiff acted in good faith and with propriety during the course of the litigation; (B) the case was close and difficult; (C) Plaintiff was a “prevailing party in litigation” when the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded her sex discrimination claim back to the district court; (D) awarding costs to a prevailing employer defendant would have a chilling effect on an employee plaintiff in discrimination suits because they would be dissuaded from seeking justice for violations of their statutory civil rights; and (E) the bill of costs includes a number of unnecessary, unreasonable, and unsubstantiated charges. Plaintiff cites White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 786 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1986), in support of her argument.

         Courts have discretion to decline awarding costs when “‘it would be inequitable under all the circumstances in the case.'” Smith v. Joy Techs., Inc., 2015 WL 428115, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2015)(quoting Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 824, 836 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Sixth Circuit has laid out a few situations where courts appropriately use their discretion to refuse costs: (1) where the prevailing party's costs are ‘unnecessary or unreasonably large'; (2) where the prevailing party has ‘unnecessarily prolong[ed] trial' or has ‘inject[ed] unmeritorious issues'; (3) where the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.