United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
OPINION & ORDER
K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE
matter is before the Court on a report and recommendation (DE
144) from Magistrate Judge Robert E. Wier. For the following
reasons, defendant Shahulhameed's objections (DE 147) are
DENIED and the Court follows the recommended
disposition (DE 144).
to August 23, 2012, Shahulhameed worked for GlobalSource IT
as a contractor in the IT department of Toyota, providing
general support to Toyota's IT infrastructure. On the
evening of August 23, 2012, Shahulhameed was fired. (DE 131
at 1). During the early hours of August 24, 2012,
"Toyota experienced a cyberattack that rendered several
of its computer servers inoperable." (DE 131 at 1).
Toyota claimed, and it was later corroborated by the FBI and
an independent investigator, that the attack came from
Shahulhameed's Toyota-owned laptop and username.
"Toyota employees spent 2, 133 hours responding to the
cyberattack between August 24 and October 30, 2012, "
costing the company an estimated $152, 070 to respond. (DE
131 at 6).
was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), by
knowingly transmitting and intentionally causing damage
without authorization to a protected computer. (DE 1). At
trial, a jury convicted Shahulhameed of the sole count. (DE
95). On June 4, 2014, this Court sentenced Shahulhameed to a
total prison sentence of 48 months followed by a 3-year term
of supervised release. (DE 111). Shahulhameed appealed and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. (DE 131).
timely submitted the current § 2255 petition on August
8, 2016. After receiving arguments from both parties,
Magistrate Judge Robert E. Wier issued a report and
recommendation to this Court. (DE 144). The Magistrate Judge
determined that Shahulhameed had failed to show any basis for
relief, and recommended this Court reject all claims.
Shahulhameed's objections to the Magistrate Judge's
findings are reviewed below.
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Shahulhameed "must
allege as a basis for relief: (1) an error of constitutional
magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory
limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so
fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid."
Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964
(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United
States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-497 (6th Cir.
2003)). In making a § 2255 motion, a movant generally
bears the burden of proving factual assertions by a
preponderance of the evidence. See McQueen v. United
States, 58 Fed.Appx. 73, 76 (6th Cir. 2003)
Court makes a de novo determination of those
portions of a recommended disposition to which objections are
made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). In this
case, Shahulhameed has made objections to the Magistrate
Judge's finding that this Court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the indicted offence, and that his retained
counsel was not ineffective for failing to offer various
pieces of evidence. See (DE 133-2). The Court
reviews these objections below.
original habeas petition, Shahulhameed argues that the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), under which he was
convicted, does not apply to his conduct. (DE 133-1 at 3).
Shahulhameed posits that the Act only applies to hacking, and
not employee misappropriation. Id.
Shahulhameed's argument is as follows:
If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action. "Because the CFAA is anti-hacking statute, not
an employee misappropriation statute [a]nd because the 18
§ U.S.C. 1030(g) statute guidelines clarifying clearly
no action under this subsection for