United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court.
Marvin William Bond, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following
reasons, the complaint will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
is incarcerated at the Christian County Jail in Hopkinsville,
Kentucky. He names as Defendants Richland County, Ohio,
prosecuting attorney Gary D. Bishop and Richland County,
Ohio, Common Pleas Judge James DeWeese. He alleges that
Defendants filed a detainer against him but failed to take
him into temporary custody within 180 days in violation of
his constitutional rights. He asks for monetary damages, as
well as dismissal of charges against him and immediate
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action if the Court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is
legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a
plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se
pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
action must be dismissed. First, the Western District of
Kentucky is not the proper venue for Plaintiff's suit
against two residents of Ohio. Because there is no special
venue statute for § 1983 civil rights actions, the venue
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 control. Under §
1391(b), a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if
all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise
be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district
in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
on the allegations in the complaint, it is evident that the
events set forth in the complaint occurred in Richland
County, Ohio. Moreover, Defendants reside in Ohio.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a
district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in
which it could have been brought.” Here, it would not
be in the interest of justice to transfer this action because
both Defendants are immune from § 1983 liability.
claim against the prosecuting attorney relates to his conduct
in his role as an advocate. To the extent the prosecutorial
attorney, Defendant Bishop, was acting in his role as an
advocate, i.e., initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution and presenting the State of Ohio's case, he
enjoys absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976); see also
Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that prosecutors were absolutely immune from claim
alleging that they conspired to knowingly bring false charges
despite claims of failure to investigate facts and alleged
commission of perjury before the grand jury). Moreover,
federal courts have no general power to compel action by
state officers in the performance of their duties. More
v. Clerk, DeKalb Cty. Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275,
1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Haggard v.
Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970).
claim against state-court judge Defendant DeWeese is also
barred by immunity. Under the doctrine of judicial immunity,
judges are entitled to judicial immunity arising out of the
performance of their judicial functions. Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219 (1988); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24
(1980). Judicial immunity from ...