United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas
B. Russell, Senior Judge United States District Court
This
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Christopher
Ford's Motion for Return of Personal Property, [R. 173],
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). The
United States has responded, [R. 190], and the time for Ford
to file a reply has passed by over three months. For the
following reasons, Ford's Motion for Return of Personal
Property, [R. 173], is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART.
BACKGROUND
On
January 10, 2017, Ford pled guilty to seven counts of charges
involving the distribution of methamphetamine and being in
possession of a firearm as a felon. [R. 106 at 2- 4 (Plea
Agreement).] On June 5, 2017, Ford filed this motion pro
se for the return of personal property he claims was
illegally taken by federal agents and local law enforcement,
including cell phones, computers, cars, trailers, and a
motorcycle. [R. 173.] Two days later, during his sentencing
hearing before the Court, Ford limited the property to be
returned to three items: a laptop computer, a desktop
computer, and the title to one car. [R. 178 at 26:18-29:14.]
Specifically, he stated he wanted his “mother's
laptop computer and her home computer that she left [him]
when she passed away. [Those are the] main things, one laptop
and one home computer, [1]” [Id. at 26:18-20], as
well as the title to an Oldsmobile Cutlass, [Id. at
28:22-29:14]. The Court verbally confirmed the dispute as to
those three items, to which Ford's counsel, Thomas
Osborne, agreed. [Id. at 32:10-12.] In the United
States' Verified Response, it stated that it would return
the laptop and the title to the Oldsmobile Cutlass to
Ford's counsel. However, it could not return the desktop
computer because it never had custody of such an item. [R.
190 at 1 (United States Response).]
STANDARD
Under
Rule 41(g), “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may
move for the property's return.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(g). “The general rule is that seized property, other
than contraband, should be returned to the rightful owner
after the criminal proceedings have terminated.”
Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569,
577 (6th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v.
LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir.1977)).
“However, the person seeking return of property must
show that they are lawfully entitled to possess it.”
United States v. Headley, 50 Fed.Appx. 266, 267 (6th
Cir.2002). “When the government has a ‘continuing
interest' in the property, the property does not have to
be returned.” United States v. Popham, 382
F.Supp.2d 942, 955 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing United
States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 263 (6th Cir.1981)).
“The court must receive evidence on any factual issue
necessary to decide the motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(g).
DISCUSSION
As the
United States has agreed to return the laptop and the title
to the car, [R. 190 at 1], the only item matter left to
decide is the return of the desktop computer. The United
States argues that denial of a Rule 41(g) motion is proper
when the federal government never had possession of the
property in question. [R. 190 at 2 (quoting United States
v. Ford, No. 2:05-CR-21, 2007 WL 837238, at *2 (E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 15, 2007)).] The Court agrees.
In
United States v. Obi, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
denial of a motion for the return of property when there was
“no evidence of record to show that the property in
question was ever in the possession of the federal
government.” 100 Fed.Appx. 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2004).
Although, in that case, the property was seized by state
police officers pursuant to a warrant issued by the state
court, this Court has broadly interpreted Obi to
mean that the denial of Obi's motion for return of
property was proper “because there was no evidence to
show that the federal government ever possessed the item at
issue.” United States v. Johnson, No.
3:02-CR-00068, 2010 WL 341548, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 22,
2010). Similarly, in the case at hand, the United States
articulates in its Verified Response that it never possessed
the desktop computer. Furthermore, Ford has failed to carry
his burden of showing “real or constructive possession
of the property by the federal government.” See
Obi, 100 Fed.Appx. at 499 (citing Clymore v. United
States, 164 F.3d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 1999).
Although Ford claims in his motion that Ballard County police
officers acted at the direction of the federal government
when they illegally seized vehicles from another person's
property jointly belonging to him, [R. 173 at 1], he did not
present evidence that the United States ever possessed any of
this property nor did he file a reply to argue against the
United States' statement that it never had possession of
the desktop computer at issue. Therefore, the Court holds
that Ford's motion in regards to the desktop computer is
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the
foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
So far
as it concerns the laptop computer and the title to an
Oldsmobile Cutlass, Ford's Motion for Return of Personal
Property, [R. 173], is GRANTED. So far as it
concerns the desktop computer allegedly located at 825
Broadway Street, Ford's Motion for Return of Property,
[R. 173], is DENIED. IT IS SO
ORDERED
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