from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio at Akron. No. 5:14-cr-00289-1-James S. Gwin,
C. Curtis, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for
E. Henderson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: CLAY, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge.
prior appeal by Luke Patterson, we determined that "the
district court should have sentenced him as an armed career
criminal" because he had three previous convictions for
a violent felony. The district court heeded those
instructions on remand. We affirm.
2014, Akron police officers stopped Patterson's car. They
found an open container of alcohol and a stolen pistol inside
it. The state and federal governments filed charges. In state
court, Patterson pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property
and driving with a suspended license. In federal court, he
pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession.
federal sentencing hearing, the district court treated
Patterson's 2001 Ohio convictions for aggravated robbery
with a deadly weapon as crimes of violence under the
Sentencing Guidelines but not under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. Patterson appealed, and the government cross-appealed.
Patterson argued (1) that the court should have dismissed his
federal indictment because it violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause and (2) that his Ohio convictions did not qualify as
crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The
government argued that the district court erred by not
treating his state court convictions as crimes of violence
under the relevant federal statute: the Armed Career Criminal
affirmed in part and reversed in part. United States v.
Patterson, 853 F.3d 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2017). We
rejected Patterson's double jeopardy argument because the
separate-sovereigns doctrine permits such dual prosecutions,
and we agreed with the district court that Patterson's
prior convictions were predicate crimes of violence under the
Guidelines. Id. at 301, 306. We disagreed, however,
with the district court's conclusion that those
convictions did not establish the requisite predicates for
the Armed Career Criminal Act. "Patterson had 'three
previous convictions . . . for a violent felony' under
[the Act], " we held, "and the district court
should have sentenced him as an armed career criminal."
Id. at 305 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). As
a result, we "reverse[d] the ruling that Patterson did
not have three previous convictions for a violent felony,
vacate[d] Patterson's sentence, and remand[ed] for
resentencing." Id. at 306.
remand, Patterson continued to argue that he should not be
sentenced as an armed career criminal. The government, he
said, had not shown that his prior offenses were in fact
three separate offenses occurring on three distinct
occasions. The district court doubted its authority to reach
this argument: "I read the mandate from the Sixth
Circuit to be more narrow" because it "specifically
ma[de] a finding that the Defendant should be sentenced as an
armed career criminal." R. 122 at 15. In the
alternative, the court found Patterson's argument
meritless because the "logical inference" from the
record was that he pleaded guilty to three different
offenses. Id. The court sentenced him to the
mandatory minimum of 180 months under the Act.
appeals again. He insists that the district court
misinterpreted the scope of our remand by refusing to
consider "any and all available legal arguments."
Br. of Appellant at 14. And he maintains that the government
has not shown that his Ohio convictions were "committed
on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C.
interpret the scope of a mandate with fresh eyes. To
determine whether we issued a limited remand or a general
one, we look to any "limiting language" in the
instructions on remand and the broader context of the
opinion. United States v. O'Dell, 320 F.3d 674,