Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Patterson

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

December 20, 2017

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Luke D. Patterson, Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. No. 5:14-cr-00289-1-James S. Gwin, District Judge.

         ON BRIEF:

          Claire C. Curtis, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.

          Carmen E. Henderson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

          Before: CLAY, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

          OPINION

          SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

          In a prior appeal by Luke Patterson, we determined that "the district court should have sentenced him as an armed career criminal" because he had three previous convictions for a violent felony. The district court heeded those instructions on remand. We affirm.

          In 2014, Akron police officers stopped Patterson's car. They found an open container of alcohol and a stolen pistol inside it. The state and federal governments filed charges. In state court, Patterson pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property and driving with a suspended license. In federal court, he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession.

         At his federal sentencing hearing, the district court treated Patterson's 2001 Ohio convictions for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines but not under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Patterson appealed, and the government cross-appealed. Patterson argued (1) that the court should have dismissed his federal indictment because it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and (2) that his Ohio convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The government argued that the district court erred by not treating his state court convictions as crimes of violence under the relevant federal statute: the Armed Career Criminal Act.

         We affirmed in part and reversed in part. United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2017). We rejected Patterson's double jeopardy argument because the separate-sovereigns doctrine permits such dual prosecutions, and we agreed with the district court that Patterson's prior convictions were predicate crimes of violence under the Guidelines. Id. at 301, 306. We disagreed, however, with the district court's conclusion that those convictions did not establish the requisite predicates for the Armed Career Criminal Act. "Patterson had 'three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony' under [the Act], " we held, "and the district court should have sentenced him as an armed career criminal." Id. at 305 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). As a result, we "reverse[d] the ruling that Patterson did not have three previous convictions for a violent felony, vacate[d] Patterson's sentence, and remand[ed] for resentencing." Id. at 306.

         On remand, Patterson continued to argue that he should not be sentenced as an armed career criminal. The government, he said, had not shown that his prior offenses were in fact three separate offenses occurring on three distinct occasions. The district court doubted its authority to reach this argument: "I read the mandate from the Sixth Circuit to be more narrow" because it "specifically ma[de] a finding that the Defendant should be sentenced as an armed career criminal." R. 122 at 15. In the alternative, the court found Patterson's argument meritless because the "logical inference" from the record was that he pleaded guilty to three different offenses. Id. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 180 months under the Act.

         Patterson appeals again. He insists that the district court misinterpreted the scope of our remand by refusing to consider "any and all available legal arguments." Br. of Appellant at 14. And he maintains that the government has not shown that his Ohio convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

         We interpret the scope of a mandate with fresh eyes. To determine whether we issued a limited remand or a general one, we look to any "limiting language" in the instructions on remand and the broader context of the opinion. United States v. O'Dell, 320 F.3d 674, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.