United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green
CHRISTOPHER MAYNARD GOLLIDAY et al. PLAINTIFFS
MISSE CAUSEY et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court.
Christopher Maynard Golliday, Dominique Cordell Wallace, and
Brad Justin Weeks initiated this action by filing a pro
se civil rights complaint. Plaintiffs Wallace and Weeks
have been terminated as parties to this action. The sole
remaining Plaintiff is Plaintiff Golliday (hereinafter
referred to as “Plaintiff”). This matter is now
before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons,
some of Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed and some
will be allowed to proceed, and Plaintiff will be given the
opportunity to amend his complaint.
is a pretrial detainee at the Warren County Regional Jail
(WCRJ). He names as Defendants WCRJ Deputy Jailer Misse
Causey; WCRJ Jailer Stephen Harmon; and WCRJ officers
Elizabeth Weissinger, Joshua Mills, and Randall Lile. He
names all Defendants in their official and individual
states that after moving to WCRJ Pod A-1 on December 2, 2016,
he “started breaking out around [his] neck and
back.” He states that he filled out several medical
forms to request to see the doctor/nurse, but all
“they” did was give him some anti-fungal cream
after “the fifth or sixth medical request” around
May 23, 2017. He states that he saw a “med-tech”
not a nurse or doctor. He alleges that he then began having
“breathing issues and stayed sick from the ceiling in
A-1 from a lot of black mold.” According to Plaintiff,
the mold forms on the shower ceiling due to poor ventilation.
He states that he filed multiple grievances about the mold
but “[t]hey never give us proper equipment to clean the
mold off, plus I'm allergic to mold.” He asserts:
It got so bad that I had to stop taking showers as often as I
was. The staff threatened to take the T.V. and phone if we
didn't clean it (the mold on the ceiling). So I started
cleaning it myself, then paying other inmates to clean the
bathroom. The break-outs has caused permanent scars on my
neck. All Misse Causey does is tell us to clean it with the
watered down bleach. . . They said that they don't issue
pure bleach to us. . . . All 12 people in the pod were
willing to clean, but when we asked for things to protect our
head, face, eyes, and neck we were denied.
relief, Plaintiff asks for monetary and punitive damages,
dismissal of misdemeanor charges in Warren County, and
“30 for 30 on remander of my federal sentence.”
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604.
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55
(1978)). Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against
Defendants, therefore, are actually against their employer,
Warren County. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433,
440 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that civil-rights suit against
county clerk of court in his official capacity was equivalent
of suing clerk's employer, the county). “[I]n an
official-capacity suit the entity's ‘policy or
custom' must have played a part in the violation of
federal law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at
166 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. at 694); Alkire v. Irving, 330
F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]o demonstrate
municipal liability, [a plaintiff] must (1) identify the
municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the
municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.”).
alleges a WCRJ policy or custom of not issuing sufficient
cleaning agents to remove black mold. On initial review, the
Court will allow the complaint to continue against Defendants
in their official capacities for this claim.