United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
N. Stivers, Judge
Christopher Raleigh, a prisoner incarcerated in the Kentucky
State Penitentiary (KSP), filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This matter is
before the Court on initial screening of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will dismiss the action.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
sues the following KSP officers in their individual
capacities: Josh Patton, Unit Administrator (U.A.) of
7-cellhouse; Chris Vincent, Lieutenant “over Property
Room”; Steven Birdsong, Sergeant; and James Corley,
complaint, Plaintiff claims that on January 19, 2017,
“They refused to give me a seized property form, and
threw my personal property away, under 8th
Admendment . . . .” He further claims, “Upon
being stripped out and placed in Observation Cell #2, I saw
[Defendants] Sgt. Birdsong and C/O Corely inventory my
personal property and set certain Item's aside to be
seized, but were thrown away instead!” Plaintiff
reports that he filed a grievance regarding the issue on
January 20, 2017; that Defendant Patton “said on the
Informal Resolution that it was in the 7C/H Property Room,
but it wasn't there at all”; that Plaintiff wrote
Warden Randy White about the situation; that Plaintiff
informed U.A. Mitchell, who is “over 7C/H of the
problem he's the one who had made me file a theif report
also”; and that the grievance process was
“completed and they said they counselled [Defendant]
C/O Corley on this matter!!” Plaintiff additionally
claims that he wrote Defendant Vincent “about the
problem and filled out numerous Property Escort Form's to
Inventory my property that is in the Yard Property Room, but
I was denied!!” As relief, Plaintiff requests,
“Damage's of personal property being thrown away
Book's, Magazine's, and ‘Family 29-count
Photo's that were of sentimental Value to me, ' I am
asking for $2, 500.00!!!!”
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007). Under § 1915A, the trial court must
review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this
duty to be less stringent “does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a
claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro
se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role
of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
alleges that his personal property was thrown away in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
deprivations are required to make out a
conditions-of-confinement claim” under the Eighth
Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992). “Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner
might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”
Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir. 1987).
“[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must
‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates.'” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984)).
viable Eighth Amendment claim must satisfy both an objective
component and a subjective component. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834; Street v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). The objective
component requires that the deprivation be
“sufficiently serious.” Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). An inmate must show
that he was deprived of “the minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The subjective component requires
the defendant to act with “deliberate
indifference” to a prisoner's health or safety.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 302-03.
“‘[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a
prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that
risk.'” Street, 102 F.3d at 815 (quoting
Farmer v Brennan, 511 U.S. at 836). “Implicit
in this standard is the recognition that the plaintiff must