United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
N. STIVERS, JUDGE.
Randy Bowman filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis.
This matter is before the Court on initial review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the
Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims upon initial
is a convicted inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary
(KSP). He sues KSP Warden Randy White; Deputy Warden Tim
Lane; Case Manager William Simpson; and Unit Manager Josh
Patton. He sues each Defendant in his official capacity only.
states that he murdered another inmate at the Little Sandy
Correctional Complex on June 30, 2016. He was convicted and
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He
reports that he was transferred to KSP in November 2016 and
placed on administrative control status in January 2017.
Plaintiff states as follows:
I am presently on my 3rd cycle of AC . . . . I
have done all that has been asked of me so as to get into the
transition program so to be placed back into population . . .
clear conduct completed 4 journal work books. But Unit
Manager Patton and case manager Simpson keep reccomending me
for AC and no threat exist . . . and Warden White and deputy
warden Lane go along with this. This is a 14th
Admendment violation as I do have a protected liberty
interest here in that I could be benefiting from the 3 cell
house transition program and all the program offers to
others. If I am a threat as projected ship me out of state or
allow me to participate in the 3 cell house program. I am
being held in 7 cell house a sensory depravation cell with
nothing but $20.00 a week in chips & cookies from the
relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief only. He states
that he is “asking this court for injunctive relief to
either put me in the transition program or ship me out of
state . . . .”
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Court construes the complaint as alleging that
Plaintiff's continued placement in disciplinary
segregation violates the Due Process Clause. However, it is
well-established that prisoners do not have a constitutional
right to be incarcerated in a particular facility, a
particular part of the facility, or to be held in a specific
security classification, unless the state has created a
liberty interest in remaining at a particular institution.
See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976);
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). This is not
the case in Kentucky, where classification, segregation, and
transfer of prisoners are within the discretion of the
corrections department. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 197.065. Courts
have also regularly held that prisoners do not enjoy a
constitutional right to rehabilitative programs. Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Canterino v.
Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 952-54 (6th Cir. 1989) (no liberty
interest in inmate classification or eligibility for work
programs). In order for the segregation of an inmate to
violate the Due Process Clause, the segregation must impose
an “atypical and significant” hardship on the
inmate “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483
(1995). Generally, there is no liberty interest in remaining
free from disciplinary segregation. Id. at 484.
allegations concerning his placement in segregation do not
demonstrate an atypical and significant hardship in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Therefore, the