United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. Hale, Judge United States
Joseph Hicks alleges various violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by Defendants
Richard F. Smith and Equifax Information Services LLC.
(Docket No. 1) Before the Court are three motions filed by
Hicks: (i) a motion for summary judgment (D.N. 27); (ii) a
motion requesting that the Court deny defense counsel's
motion to appear pro hac vice (D.N. 39); and (iii) a motion
to admit “Exhibit Y” to Hicks's list of
exhibits (D.N. 40). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will deny without prejudice Hicks's motion for
summary judgment. The Court will deny Hicks's other
filed this lawsuit on April 21, 2017. (D.N. 1) On the same
day, Hicks moved for summary judgment on his claims. (D.N. 4)
The motion was premature and defective because it did not
comply with Local Rule 7.1(e), as Hicks failed to submit a
proposed order with the motion. (See D.N. 5) Hicks
then filed a second motion for summary judgment (D.N. 27), as
well as motions to amend his complaint. (D.N. 26; D.N. 28)
The Court denied the first summary-judgment motion as moot
(D.N. 37), upon Hicks's request to terminate his
“redundant” motions. (See D.N. 35) The
Court also granted Hicks's motions to amend his
complaint. (D.N. 41) Hicks has now filed a motion that asks
the Court to deny Defendants' motion to allow attorney
Norman Charles Campbell to appear pro hac vice. (D.N. 39)
Hicks also moves to admit “Exhibit Y” to his list
of exhibits, presumably for purposes of summary judgment.
Court's discussion of the pending motions will be brief,
as Hicks's motion for summary judgment is deficient and
his other two motions are moot. As an initial matter, Hicks
filed his motion asking the Court to deny Defendants'
motion to appear pro hac vice after this Court had already
granted Defendants' motion in accordance with L.R. 83.2.
(D.N. 36) Indeed, the Defendants' motion to appear pro
hac vice was appropriate and thus Hicks's motion is
meritless. (See id.) The Court will accordingly deny
Hicks's motion as moot.
Court will also deny Hicks's motion for summary judgment.
This motion suffers from several deficiencies. First, Hicks
has again failed to comply with L.R. 7.1(e) by not attaching
a proposed order to his motion. Indeed, the motion fails to
comply with L.R. 7.1 in several respects, since it fails to
“state with particularity the grounds for the motion,
the relief sought, and the legal argument necessary to
support it.” (See D.N. 27) The motion merely
parrots the allegations set forth in Hicks's amended
complaint in a conclusory fashion with little to no legal
argument involved. (See D.N. 27; D.N. 42) This is
insufficient. See Voytko v. Consol. Rail Corp., No.
94-4240, 1996 WL 452934, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996)
(“At summary judgment, a Plaintiff must do more than
merely repeat the allegations which appear in his
for several of his claims, Hicks fails to cite to the record
in support of summary judgment. For example, in support of
his request for summary judgment on Claim 16, Hicks merely
states that “Plaintiff stands by claim 16 as
written.” (D.N. 27, PageID # 214) In requesting summary
judgment as to Claim 26, Hicks notes that his “Experian
Credit Report speaks for itself and thus Equifax “can
present no explanation or defense.” (Id.,
PageID # 215) This is insufficient. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) (White, J.,
concurring) (“It is not enough to move for summary
judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a
conclusory assertion that the [nonmoving party] has no
evidence to prove his case.”).
as Equifax notes in its response, “[t]he
‘affidavit' attached to [Hicks's motion for
summary judgment] fails to qualify as an affidavit because it
was not ‘written down and sworn by the declarant before
an office authorized to administer oaths, such as a notary
public.'” (D.N. 31, PageID # 232 (quoting Smith
v. Rees, No. 5:07CV-P-180-R, 2007 WL 4119031, at *1
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2007))) The “affidavit”
likewise does not qualify as a declaration because Hicks does
not state that he is making his statements under penalty of
perjury. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 611
n.20 (6th Cir. 1998). Thus, any attempt by Hicks to cure the
deficiencies of his motion with this “affidavit”
because Exhibit Y does not fix the deficiencies in Hick's
motion for summary judgment, the Court will deny his motion
to admit Exhibit Y as moot.
reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise
sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED
Hicks's motion for summary judgment (D.N. 27) is
DENIED without prejudice.
Hicks's motion to deny Defendants' motion to appear
pro hac vice (D.N. 39) and motion to admit ...