United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE.
Glenn is an inmate at the Federal Medical Center in
Lexington, Kentucky. Proceeding without a lawyer, Glenn has
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. [R. 1]. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court will deny Glenn's petition.
2003, a jury found Glenn guilty of distribution of Xanax and
distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841. See United States v. Glenn, No.
1:02-cr-030-JD-1 (D.N.H. 2003). The United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire determined that Glenn
was a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.1 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines because he had at least two
prior felony convictions for a controlled substance offense.
See Id. at R. 68 at 2-3; United States v.
Glenn, 389 F.3d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 2004). Therefore,
Glenn's guidelines range was 262 to 327 months in prison.
See United States v. Glenn, No. 1:02-cr-030-JD-1
(D.N.H. 2003) at R. 68 at 3. In March 2004, the district
court sentenced Glenn to 262 months in prison. See
Id. at R. 51, R. 68 at 3.
filed a direct appeal, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence.
See United States v. Glenn, 389 F.3d 283 (1st Cir.
2004). Glenn later filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but the district court
denied that motion and the First Circuit denied Glenn's
request for a certificate of appealability. See Charles
Glenn v. United States, No. 1:05-cv-074-JD (D.N.H. 2005)
at R. 12, R. 27.
has now filed a § 2241 petition with this Court. [R. 1].
Glenn argues that his prior convictions did not qualify as
controlled substance offenses for purposes of § 4B1.1 of
the sentencing guidelines and, thus, the district court erred
when it determined that he was a career offender. Glenn cites
the Supreme Court's decisions in Descamps v. United
States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), and Mathis v. United
States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), to support his petition.
§ 2241 petition constitutes an impermissible collateral
attack on his sentence. While a federal prisoner may
challenge the legality of his sentence through a direct
appeal and a § 2255 motion, he generally may not do so
in a § 2241 petition. See United States v.
Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining
the distinction between a § 2255 motion and a §
2241 petition). After all, a § 2241 petition is usually
only a vehicle for challenges to actions taken by prison
officials that affect the manner in which the prisoner's
sentence is being carried out, such as computing sentence
credits or determining parole eligibility. See Terrell v.
United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). Simply
put, Glenn cannot use a § 2241 petition as a way of
challenging his sentence.
nevertheless suggests that he can attack his sentence in a
§ 2241 petition, and he cites Hill v. Masters,
836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016), to support his position. [R.
1-1 at 2, 5-6]. It is true that, in Hill, the Sixth
Circuit indicated for the first time that a prisoner may
challenge his sentence in a § 2241 petition. See
Hill, 836 F.3d at 599. However, in doing so, the Sixth
Circuit expressly limited its decision to the following, very
(1) prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory
guidelines regime pre-United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 . . . (2005), (2) who were foreclosed from filing a
successive petition under § 2255, and (3) when a
subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by
the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a
predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement.
Id. at 599-600.
circumstances do not apply in this case. To be sure, Glenn
was sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime
pre-Booker, and he may be foreclosed from filing a
successive petition under § 2255. However, he has not
identified a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory
interpretation by the Supreme Court that reveals that one of
his previous convictions was not a controlled substance
offense for purposes of § 4B1.1's career-offender
enhancement. Glenn has cited Descamps and
Mathis, two cases that discuss the approach courts
should use to determine whether a prior conviction
constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career
Criminal Act. But he has not demonstrated in any clear way
how those cases prove that his prior convictions are not
controlled substance offenses for purposes of § 4B1.1.
Therefore, Glenn's § 2241 petition is simply
it is hereby ORDERED as follows: