United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. STIVERS, JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (DN 25), and Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment (DN 26, 27). The motions are ripe for
adjudication. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants'
motions are GRANTED, and Plaintiff's
motion is DENIED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIMS
lawsuit arises from claims by Plaintiff Jeffery Allen Webb
(“Webb”) during his incarceration at the Warren
County Regional Jail (“WCRJ”). In the pro
se Complaint, Webb asserts violations of his Eighth
Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Warren County Jailer Jackie Strode (“Strode”) and
Southern Health Partners (SHP)
“Administrator/MTA” Jamie Pruitt
(“Pruitt”). (Compl. 2, DN 1).
alleges that Defendants denied him medical treatment for
“serious chronic and progressive back pain arising from
spinal fractures dating back to 2004.” (Compl. 4). He
claims that two months prior to his incarceration at WCRJ,
“[he] was afforded 30 days of Mobic, a non-steroidal
pain medication, by Trent the Nurse Practitioner. This worked
well but [he] [was] told by staff that Southern Health
Partners  doesn't treat chronic pain.” (Compl.
5). Webb asserts that he was given ibuprofen for “2-5
day periods sporadically” and was told for months that
he was on the list to see the SHP doctor “but they had
no idea when he will come.” (Compl. 5).
performing an initial review of this case, the Court allowed
his Eighth Amendment claims to proceed. Following discovery,
the parties have moved for summary judgment, which are ripe
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of this matter based
upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact
that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as
a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the initial burden stating the basis for
the motion and identifying evidence in the record that
demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the
non-moving party must then produce specific evidence proving
the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more
than merely show the existence of some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must
present specific facts proving that a genuine factual issue
exists by “citing to particular parts of the materials
in the record” or by “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine
dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Defendants' Motions for Summary
move for summary judgment on the bases, inter alia,
that Webb has failed to prove deliberate indifference or any
detrimental effects arising from any alleged delay in
treatment. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 5-7, DN 26-1;
Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 5, DN 27). Defendants also seek
summary judgment because Plaintiff has ...