United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, London
OPINION AND ORDER
K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE.
plaintiff Robert Ellison brought this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of an
administrative decision denying his claim for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits.
The Court, having reviewed the record, will affirm the
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Court's review of the decision by the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) is limited to determining whether
it “is supported by substantial evidence and was made
pursuant to proper legal standards.” Rabbers v.
Comm'r Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009).
denying Ellison's claim, the ALJ engaged in the five-step
sequential process set forth in the regulations under the
Social Security Act (the “Act”). 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)-(e). See, e.g., Walters v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).
one, the ALJ determined that Ellison has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2005, the
alleged onset date. (Administrative Record (“AR”)
two, the ALJ determined that Ellison did not have a severe
impairment prior to the expiration of his insured status on
December 31, 2006, making him ineligible for disability
insurance benefits. With regard to Ellison's application
for Supplemental Social Security Income payments, however,
the ALJ determined that, after the expiration of
Ellison's insured status, Ellison suffered from the
combined severed impairments of a history of bilateral
shoulder dislocations with evidence of ongoing mild right
shoulder separation; obesity; traumatic arthritis of the left
ankle, status post ankle fracture; depressive disorder, not
otherwise specified; and alcohol dependency. (AR at 120.)
three, the ALJ found that, since the expiration of
Ellison's insured status, he has not had an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments. (AR at 123.)
proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that, since the
expiration of Ellison's insured status, Ellison has had
the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform
“medium” work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), except that he can:
perform no more than occasional kneeling, crouching, crawling
and climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds and no more than
frequent operation of foot controls or pushing/pulling with
the left lower extremity. He can understand and remember
simple instructions and procedures; can sustain attention,
concentration and pace for simple task completion; can
tolerate occasional, casual contact with coworkers,
supervisors and the general public; and can adapt to
occasional changes in the workplace that are gradually
introduced with reasonable support and structure.
(AR at 125.)
four, the ALJ determined that Ellison has no past relevant
work. (AR at 128.) At step five, the ALJ determined that,
given Ellison's RFC, age, education, and work experience,
since the expiration of his insured status, there have been
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Ellison can perform and, thus, he is not
disabled. (AR at 128.)
raises really only one objection to the ALJ's decision.
He argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find that Chronic
Obstructive Pulminary Disease (COPD) and chest pains were
severe impairments and ...