United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. Russell, Senior Judge
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Artis Anderson's
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
[DN 3.] Defendants Kentucky One Health, Inc. and the Kentucky
Court of Justice, (collectively, “Defendants”),
have responded. [DN 8; DN 10.] The time for Plaintiff to file
a reply has passed. This matter is now ripe for adjudication.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is
filed the instant Motion alleging violations of “every
Constitutional right that the Plaintiff has….”
[DN 3, at 2.] Plaintiff argues that Defendants, among other
individuals and organizations, conspired to act illegally,
thereby violating his Constitutional rights, including the
fundamental right to marry, as well as entering judgments
that Plaintiff alleges are “void.” [See
id.] The impetus of Plaintiff's Motion appears to be
the loss of guardianship over his then-wife, Mary Ellen
Reynolds, (“Ms. Reynolds”), and the eventual
annulment of that marriage by the Woodford County District
Court. Plaintiff alleges that the Woodford County Emergency
Medical Services (“Woodford EMS”) were called to
his home on May 18, 2015 (about one week after the
couple's marriage) under the pretense of what Plaintiff
refers to as a “welfare check, ” during which
time Woodford EMS lied to Plaintiff, “falsely claiming
that [Ms. Reynolds'] medical condition was
serious.” [DN 3, at 1-2.] This episode is alleged by
Plaintiff to be a “common scheme executed by predators
seeking to steal money and property from elderly
citizens.” [Id. at 2.]
in a 2015 proceeding in Woodford County District Court, the
Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Guardian Services
Branch, (“CHFS”), was appointed guardian of Ms.
Reynolds “following a jury determination that Ms.
Reynolds was wholly disabled in managing her personal affairs
and financial resources.” [DN 7, at 33.] Woodford
County District Court Judge Vanessa Dickson presided over
that case. Plaintiff's Motion contends that Judge Dickson
“violated at least five provisions of Kentucky's
statutes which rendered her decision/judgment VOID per
Kentucky's Supreme Court.” [DN 3, at 2.]
March 28, 2016, the Jessamine County Family Court entered
judgment in a case between Ms. Reynolds and Plaintiff,
annulling the brief marriage between them. [DN 7, at 33.] In
doing so, the Jessamine County Family Court noted that Ms.
Reynolds' primary care physician, Dr. Thomas Coburn, had
serious concerns regarding Ms. Reynolds' mental health in
2014, but that on May 11, 2015, Plaintiff and Ms. Reynolds
went to the Woodford County Clerk's Office and obtained a
marriage license. [Id. at 34.] Multiple individuals
from the Clerk's Office testified to Ms. Reynolds'
state as “disheveled” or in
“disarray.” [Id.] Thereafter, Ms.
Reynolds' mental state was a point of constant concern,
which led the Jessamine County Family Court to rule that Ms.
Reynolds lacked the capacity to effectively consent to
marrying Plaintiff, and the marriage was thus declared a
nullity. [Id. at 37.] These allegations provide the
backdrop for Plaintiff's instant Motion, wherein he
concludes by arguing that he “is entitled as a matter
of law to an injunction against the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
[its] agents, officials, and employees, and all other
persons, to protect and enforce his Constitutional
rights….” [DN 3, at 4.]
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which
should be granted only if the movant carries his or her
burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand
it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty.
Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). In
reaching a decision as to whether a preliminary injunction
should be granted, there are four factors of particular
import: “(1) the likelihood of the plaintiff's
success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction will save
the plaintiff from irreparable injury; (3) whether the
injunction would harm others; and (4) whether the public
interest would be served.” Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, Loc. Union No. 1937 v.
Norfolk Southern Corp., 927 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir.
1991). The Court examines each factor separately and balances
them, “mak[ing] specific findings concerning each of
the four factors, unless fewer are dispositive of the
issue.” Id. Notably, “the proof required
for the plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction is much
more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary
judgment motion.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d
729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000).
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
principal consideration for courts when determining whether
to grant a preliminary injunction is the movant's
likelihood of success on the merits. Indeed,
“[a]lthough no one factor is controlling, a finding
that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits
is usually fatal.” Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of
Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d
1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] preliminary injunction
issued where there is simply no likelihood of success on the
merits must be reversed.”)). The Court finds that
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence tending to show any
likelihood of success on the merits of this case. To be sure,
he makes many allegations concerning what he believes to be
the unlawful annulment of his marriage and the unlawful
manner in which CHFS obtained guardianship over Ms. Reynolds,
but he does not provide support in the form of evidence.
Plaintiff avers that Judge Dickson issued a “void
judgment” with respect to the guardianship issue, made
false claims in court, and violated “at least five
provisions of Kentucky's statutes, ” but does not
apprise the Court of which statutes were violated, how they
were violated, or evidence showing that they were actually
additional arguments consist of sweeping allegations, such as
“[t]wo Circuit Judges have entered judgments against
the Plaintiff predicated on Judge Dickson's VOID
judgments and under circumstances, these judges violated 18
USC § 1589.” [DN 3, at 3.] 18 U.S.C. § 1589
is the federal Forced Labor statute, containing a prohibition
on obtaining labor or services from an individual through
means such as force, physical restraint, abuse, and threats.
Plaintiff does not explain how this statute applies to this
case, or how or when specifically these unnamed judges
violated that statute. While the Court is sensitive to the
fact that Plaintiff's marriage was annulled, and that
CHFS was appointed guardian, these two facts, without any
evidence tending to show that the actions were taken
illegally, are insufficient to show any likelihood of success
on the merits. This factor weighs in favor of Defendants.
irreparable injury requirement is a significant, and possibly
determinative, factor in whether a court may grant a
preliminary injunction. Friendship Materials, Inc. v.
Michigan Brick, Inc.,679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982).
“[T]he harm alleged must be both certain and great,
rather than speculative or theoretical.” State of
Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 812
F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1987). This means that the injury
must be of such imminence that there is a clear and immediate
need for relief in order to prevent harm. Wis. Gas. Co.
v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n,758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). Plaintiff's Motion fails to provide the Court
with evidence showing “a clear and immediate need for
relief, see id., instead merely relying on sweeping
allegations regarding past harms he has allegedly suffered.
It is unclear to the Court how the grant of a preliminary
injunction at this time would remedy Plaintiff's past
issues, nor does Plaintiff actually contend that he ...